Robust protocols for securely expanding randomness and distributing keys
  using untrusted quantum devices by Miller, Carl A. & Shi, Yaoyun
ar
X
iv
:1
40
2.
04
89
v4
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
9 J
ul 
20
16
Robust protocols for securely expanding randomness and
distributing keys using untrusted quantum devices
Carl A. Miller and Yaoyun Shi
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
carlmi,shiyy@umich.edu
August 1, 2016
Abstract
Randomness is a vital resource for modern day information processing, especially for cryp-
tography. A wide range of applications critically rely on abundant, high quality random num-
bers generated securely. Here we show how to expand a random seed at an exponential rate
without trusting the underlying quantum devices. Our approach is secure against the most
general adversaries, and has the following new features: cryptographic level of security, toler-
ating a constant level of imprecision in the devices, requiring only a unit size quantummemory
per device component for the honest implementation, and allowing a large natural class of con-
structions for the protocol. In conjunct with a recent work by Chung, Shi and Wu, it also leads
to robust unbounded expansion using just 2 multi-part devices. When adapted for distributing
cryptographic keys, our method achieves, for the first time, exponential expansion combined
with cryptographic security and noise tolerance. The proof proceeds by showing that the Rényi
divergence of the outputs of the protocol (for a specific bounding operator) decreases linearly
as the protocol iterates. At the heart of the proof are a new uncertainty principle on quantum
measurements, and a method for simulating trusted measurements with untrusted devices.
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1 Background and Summary of Results
1.1 The Problem and Its Motivations
Randomness is an indispensable resource for modern day information processing. Without ran-
domness, therewould be no fast randomized algorithms, accurate statistical scientific simulations,
fair gaming, or secure cryptography. A wide range of applications rely on methods for generating
randomness with high quality and in a large quantity. Consider, for example, all the computers
and handheld devices that connect to the Internet using public key cryptography such as RSA and
DSA for authentication and encryption, and that use secret key cryptography for secure connec-
tions. It is probably conservative to estimate that the number of random bits used each day for
cryptography is in the order of trillions.
While randomness seems to be abundant in everyday life, its efficient and secure generation
is a difficult problem. A typical random number generator such as the /dev/random/ generator
in Linux kernel, would start with random “seeds”, including the thermal noise of the hardware
(e.g. from Intel’s Ivy Bridge processors), system boot time in nanoseconds, user inputs, etc., and
apply a deterministic function to produce required random bits. Those methods suffer from at
least three fundamental vulnerabilities.
The first is due to the fact that no deterministic procedure can increase randomness. Thuswhen
there is not enough randomness to start with, the output randomness is not sufficient to guaran-
tee security. In particular, if the internal state of the pseudorandom generator is correctly guessed
or is exposed for other reasons, the output would become completely predictable to the adver-
sary. The peril of the lack of entropy has been demonstrated repeatedly [Gutterman et al., 2006,
Ristenpart and Yilek, 2010, Lenstra et al., 2012]. [Heninger et al., 2012] were able to break the DSA
secret keys of over 1% of the SSH hosts that they scanned on the Internet, by exploiting the insuf-
ficient randomness used to generate the keys.
The second vulnerability is that the security of current pseudorandom generators are not
only based on unproven assumptions, such as the hardness of factoring the product of two large
primes, but also assume that their adversaries have limited computational capability. Therefore,
they will fail necessarily if the hardness assumptions turn out to be completely false, or the ad-
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Figure 1: A three-part device playing the GHZ game. Each part D1, D2, and D3, re-
ceives a single bit and outputs a single bit. The input (x, y, z) is drawn uniformly from
{(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)}. The device wins if a ⊕ b ⊕ c = x ∨ y ∨ z. No communica-
tion among the parts is allowed when the game starts. An optimal classical strategy is for each
part to output 1, winning with 3/4 probability. An optimal quantum strategy is for the three parts
to share the GHZ state 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), and for each part to measure σx on input 0, and measure
σy on input 1. This strategy wins with certainty.
versaries gain dramatic increase in computational power, such as through developing quantum
computers.
Finally, all those methods rely on trusting the correctness and truthfulness of the generator.
The dynamics of market economy leads to a small number of vendors supplying the hardware
for random number generation. The demand for platform compatibility results in a small number
of generating methods. Thus the risk of the generators containing exploitable vulnerabilities or
secret backdoors is necessarily significant. Recent evidence suggest that this is in fact the real-
ity [Perlroth et al., 2013]. Thus for users demanding the highest level of security with the mini-
mum amount of trust, no current solution is satisfactory.
Quantummechanics postulates true randomness, thus provides a promising approach for mit-
igating those drawbacks. Applying a sequence of quantum operations can increase entropy even
when the operations are applied deterministically, as some quantum operations are inherently
unpredictable. Indeed, commercial random number generators based on quantum technology
have started to emerge (e.g. by ID Quantique SA). Furthermore, the randomness produced can be
unconditionally secure, i.e. without assumptions on the computational power of the adversary.
However, as classical beings, users of quantum random number generators cannot be certain
that the quantum device — the quantum state inside and the quantum operations applied — is
running according to the specification. How can a classical user ensure that a possibly malicious
quantum device is working properly?
Non-local games — games with multiple non-communicating players — provide such a pos-
sibility. Consider, for example, the celebrated GHZ game [Greenberger et al., 1989] illustrated in
Fig. (1). It is now known ([McKague, 2014], see also [Miller and Shi, 2013]) that any quantum strat-
egy achieving close to the optimal quantumwinning probability must be very close to the optimal
strategy itself. Consequently, the output of each component is near perfectly random. Intuitively,
one needs only to run the game multiple times (using some initial randomness to choose the in-
put string for each round) and if the observed winning average is close to the optimal quantum
winning probability, then the output should be sufficiently random. Therefore, the trust on the
quantum device can now be replaced by the condition of non-communication between the differ-
ent components. This condition can be verified through classical means, e.g., by separating the
components at a distance so that they do not have time to communicate.
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[Colbeck, 2006, Colbeck and Kent, 2011] proposedusing nonlocal games as the basis for untrusted-
device randomness expansion. Turning the intuition above into rigorous proofs turns out to
be rather challenging. Classical security was proved in [Pironio et al., 2010], [Fehr et al., 2013],
[Pironio and Massar, 2013], and in the later work [Coudron et al., 2013], which allowed a very
broad class of nonlocal games. While useful, classical security does not guard against quantum
adversaries, thus is inadequate as quantum computation is becoming a reality. Furthermore, an
expansion protocol without quantum security cannot be safely composed with other quantum
protocols. [Vazirani and Vidick, 2012] were the first to prove quantum security, using a protocol
that expands the initial seed exponentially.
1.2 Related Problems
The randomness expansion problem is closely related to the problem of quantum key distribution
(QKD), where two parties at a distance wish to establish a common (random) secret using a public
quantum channel. Key distribution is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, and also one of the
oldest problems in quantum information [Bennett and Brassard, 1984, Ekert, 1991, Mayers, 2001,
Lo and Chau, 1999, Biham et al., 2006, Shor and Preskill, 2000].
Also, untrusted-device randomness expansion is part of the broader area of untrusted-device,
or “device-independent,” quantum cryptography. This area of quantum cryptography was pio-
neered by [Mayers and Yao, 1998]. It was also developed in parallel by other researchers, such
as [Barrett et al., 2005], from the perspective of non-locality with inspirations from [Ekert, 1991].
It has now become an important and intensively studied paradigm for understanding the power
and limitations of quantum cryptography.
An important related problem in untrusted-device cryptography is randomness amplification
[Colbeck and Renner, 2012], where one wants to obtain near-perfect randomness from a weak ran-
dom source using untrusted quantum devices (and without any additional randomness). The pa-
per [Chung et al., 2014], which is a companion paper to the present one (with a common author)
studies the amplification problem.
1.3 Overview of Our Results
In this work, we analyze a simple exponentially expanding untrusted-device randomness expan-
sion protocol (referred to as the one-shot protocol). We give a proof of security against the most
general quantum adversaries. More importantly, we accomplish all of the following additional
features, none of which has been accomplished by previous works.
The first is cryptographic security in the output.1 The error parameters are not only exponentially
small in the input length, but are also negligible (i.e. smaller than any inverse polynomial function)
in the running time of the protocol (which is asymptotically the number of uses of the device.) This
is the conventional theoretical requirement for cryptographic level of security — the chance that
an adversary can distinguish the protocol output from an ideal uniform distribution is negligible,
as measured against the amount of resource used for running the protocol.
Secondly, the protocol is robust, i.e. tolerating a constant level of “noise”, or implementation
imprecision. Thus any honest implementation that performs below the optimal level by a small
constant amount will still pass our test with overwhelming probability. For example, we show
that any device which wins the GHZ game with probability at least 0.985 will achieve exponential
randomness expansion with probability approaching 1.
1We thank Kai-Min Chung and Xiaodi Wu for pointing out this feature of our result.
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Third, our protocol requires only a constant size quantum memory for an honest implementation.
In between two rounds of interactions, the different components of the device are allowed to
interact arbitrarily. Thus an honest device could establish its entanglement on the fly, and needs
only to maintain the entanglement (with a constant level of fidelity) for the duration of a single
game. Given the challenge of maintaining coherent quantum states, this feature greatly reduces
implementation complexity.2
Fourth, relying on a powerful observation of Chung, Shi and Wu [Chung et al., 2014] — what
they call the Equivalence Lemma — we show that one can sequentially compose instances of our
one-shot protocol, alternating between two untrusted devices and achieve unbounded randomness
expansion starting with a fixed length seed. The additively accumulating error parameters remain
almost identical to the one-shot errors, since they decrease geometrically.
Finally, our protocol allows a large natural class of games to be used. The class consists of all
binary XOR games — games whose inputs and outputs are binary and whose scoring function
depends on the inputs and the XOR of the outputs — that are strongly self-testing. The latter
property says that any quantum strategy that is ǫ-close to optimal in its winning probability must
beO(
√
ǫ) close to a unique optimal strategy in its both its state and its measurements. (We call this
“strongly self-testing” because this error relationship is the best possible.) We explored this class
previously in [Miller and Shi, 2013]. The class of strong self-tests includes the CHSH game and the
GHZ game, two commonly used games in quantum information. Broadening the class of usable
games has the benefit of enabling greater design space, as different implementation technologies
may favor different games. (For example, the highly accurate topological quantum computing
approach using Majorana fermions is known not to be quantum universal [Nayak et al., 2008]. In
particular, Deng and Duan [Deng and Duan, 2013] showed that for randomness expansion using
Majorana fermions, three qubits are required. Our proof allows the use of Majorana fermions for
randomness expansion through the GHZ game.)
We include two applications of our expansion protocols. Our protocol can be used in combina-
tionwith the randomness amplification results of [Chung et al., 2014] to create a robust, untrusted-
device quantum protocol that converts an arbitrary weak random source into near-perfect output
randomness of an arbitrary large length. This opens the possibility for unconditionally secure
cryptography with the minimum trust on the randomness source and the implementing device.
The second application is to adapt our protocol for untrusted-device quantum key distribution,
resulting in a robust and secure protocol that requires only a small (polylogarithmic) initial seed.
1.4 Related Works
Prior to our paper, the groundbreaking work of [Vazirani and Vidick, 2012] was the first and only
work achieving simultaneous exponential expansion and quantum security. As far as we know
from their analysis, their security proof achieves only inverse polynomial security, and thus is not
cryptographically secure; it is not noise-tolerant (as it requires perfect behavior on some rounds);
and it also does not have the feature of constant-sized quantum memory.
Robust DI-QKD was already achieved with full security in [Vazirani and Vidick, 2014]. (There
were also previous non-robust proofs [Barrett et al., 2012, Reichardt et al., 2013] and proofs that
require that the number of devices increases with the length of the key, e.g., [Hänggi et al., 2010],
[Masanes et al., 2011].) The new feature offered by our QKD result is that our seed is polylogarith-
mic, while that of [Vazirani and Vidick, 2014] is linear.
2An alternative for achieving the small quantum memory requirement is to introduce an additional device compo-
nent that is required to function as an entanglement creation and distribution component and cannot receive informa-
tion from other device components. This model would require a communication restriction throughout the protocol.
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The paper [Vazirani and Vidick, 2014] on untrusted-device QKD can be considered as a ro-
bust randomness expansion protocol with a linear rate of expansion (without the constant mem-
ory feature). A natural way to develop [Vazirani and Vidick, 2014] further as an expansion re-
sult would be to change the input distribution to one that is non-uniform (so as to require less
than a linear seed) and to apply the proof to a more general class of games (such as those of
[Coudron et al., 2013]). To our knowledge a formal analysis of these generalizations has not yet
been published, and they are a topic for further research.
[Coudron and Yuen, 2014] did contemporaneouswork on the problem of unbounded random-
ness expansion. Their paper was the first to prove that (non-robust) unbounded expansion is
possible with a constant number of devices. We independently proved that robust expansion is
possible with log∗(N) devices. After we learned of their work we observed that a result with both
features— robustness and a constant number of devices— follows by combining results from our
work and [Chung et al., 2014]. We discuss this more in the next subsection (see the remarks that
follow Corollary 1.6).
1.5 Technical Statements
Our main protocol (Figure 2) is based on [Pironio et al., 2010] and [Coudron et al., 2013]. (Indeed,
it is only a slightmodification of a protocol from the classical security results of [Coudron et al., 2013]
— the main differences are the class of games that we use, and most importantly, that we explicitly
allow in-between-rounds quantum communication.) We use the idea from [Pironio et al., 2010] to
conserve seed by giving a fixed input to the device on most rounds.
The gameswe use involve n parties, with n ≥ 2. Such a game is played by a single device, which
consists of n components, where each component has a classical input/output interface.3 For any
game that we use, we let wG denote the highest winning probability which can be achieved by a
quantum strategy, and let fG = 1−wG denote the smallest possible failure probability that can be
achieved by a quantum strategy.
We discuss some the concepts necessary to evaluate the security of Protocol R. We measure
the amount of randomness produced by the quantum min-entropy Hmin(X|E), where X denotes
the output of the protocol and E denotes the (possibly quantum) information possessed by an
adversary. This quantity is appropriate because it measures the amount of uniformly random bits
that can be extracted from X by a randomess extractor (see Chapter 5 of [Renner, 2005]).
Let y ≥ 0. We will say that a subnormalized classical-quantum state ρ is y-ideal if its normal-
ization ρ/Tr(ρ) has conditional min-entropy greater than or equal to y. (For convenience, we will
say that the zero state is y-ideal for all y.) Let ǫs, ǫc,λ be reals in [0, 1]. A randomness expansion
protocol is said to have a yield of y extractable bits with a soundness error ǫs if for any device D, and
any purifying system E for D, the state of (X, E) corresponding to the “success” event is always
within trace distance ǫs of a y-ideal state. It is said to have a completeness error ǫc with noise level λ
if there exists an implementation, referred to as the “correct” implementation, so that for any im-
plementation which deviates by no more than λ from the correct implementation, the probability
of aborting is always ≤ ǫc. If both the soundness and the completeness errors are ≤ ǫ, we simply
say the protocol has an error ǫ.
3We note that the literature on this subject has some differences in terminology. Some authors would use the word
“device” in the way that we have used the word “component.”
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Arguments:
N : a positive integer (the output length.)
η : A real ∈ (0, 12 ). (The error tolerance.)
q : A real ∈ (0, 1). (The test probability.)
G : An n-player nonlocal game that is a
strong self-test [Miller and Shi, 2013].
D : An untrusted device (with n compo-
nents) that can play G repeatedly and
cannot receive any additional infor-
mation. In a single use the different
components cannot communicate; in
between uses, there is no restriction.
D1 D2 Dn
g
result
A diagram of Protocol R. The dotted red lines de-
note in-between-round communications.
Protocol R:
1. A bit g ∈ {0, 1} is chosen according to a biased (1− q, q) distribution.
2. If g = 1 (“game round”), then an input string is chosen at random from {0, 1}n (according
a probability distribution specified by G) and given to D. Depending on the outputs, a“P”
(pass) or an “F” (fail) is recorded according to the rules of the game G.
3. If g = 0 (“generation round”), then the input string 00 . . . 0 is given to the device, and the
output of the first component D1 is determined. If the output of the first component is 0, the
event H (“heads”) is recorded; otherwise the event T (“tails”) is recorded.
4. Steps 1− 3 are repeated N − 1 (more) times.
5. If the total number of failures exceeds (1−wG + η) qN, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the
protocol succeeds. If the protocol succeeds, the output consists of an N-length sequence
from the alphabet {P, F,H, T} representing the outcomes of each round.
Figure 2: The Central Protocol R
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Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1.1 (Main Theorem). For any n-player strong self-test G, and any δ > 0, there exist positive
constants q0, η0,K, b, such that the following hold when Protocol R is executed with parameters q ≤ q0,
η ≤ η0.
1. (Soundness.) The yield is at least (1− δ)N extractable bits with a soundness error ǫs = K exp(−bqN).
2. (Completeness.) For any constant η′, 0 < η′ < η, the protocol tolerates η′ noise level with a
completeness error ǫc = exp(−(η − η′)2qN/3).
The difficult part of this result is the soundness claim, which follows from the results of sec-
tion 8 (see Corollary 8.7). The completeness claim follows from the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality,
and is proved in Proposition 8.13.
Note that the bits g1, . . . , gN can be generated by O(Nh(q)) uniformly random bits with an er-
ror exp(−Ω(qN)), where h denotes the Shannon entropy function. Therefore, when q is chosen to
be small, the protocol needs only ω(logN) initial bits and one device to achieve Ω(N) extractable
bits with negligible error.
Corollary 1.2 (One-shot Min-entropy Expansion). For any real ω ∈ (0, 1), setting q = Θ(kω/2k1−ω)
in Theorem 1.1, Protocol R converts any k uniform bits to 2k
1−ω
extractable bits with exp(−Ω(kω)) sound-
ness and completeness errors.
To obtain near perfect random bits, we apply a quantum-proof strong randomness extractor,
in particular one that extracts a source of a linear amount of conditional quantum min-entropy.
The parameters of our protocols depend critically on the seed length of such extractors, thus we
introduce the following definition.
Definition 1.3 (Seed Length Index). We call a real ν a seed length index if there exists a quantum-proof
strong extractor extracting Θ(N) bits from a (N,Θ(N)) source with error parameter ǫ using log1/ν(N/ǫ)
bits of seed. Denote by µ the supremum of all seed length indices.
Such extractors exist with ν ≥ 1/2, e.g., Trevisan’s extractors [Trevisan, 2001] shown to be
quantum-proof by De et al. [De et al., 2012]. Thus µ ≥ 1/2. The definition of soundness error for
producing y bits of perfect randomness is the same for producing extractable random bits, except
that the ideal C-Q state conditioned on Success is the product state of y perfectly random bits and a
quantum state. The following corollary follows directly by composing protocol R and an extractor
with ν close to µ.
Corollary 1.4 (One-shot Randomness Expansion). For any ω ∈ (0, µ), setting q = Θ(kω/2kµ−ω) in
Theorem 1.1, Protocol R composed with an appropriate quantum-proof strong extractor converts k bits to
2k
µ−ω
uniform bits with soundness and completeness errors exp(−Ω(kω)).
The next corollary addresses cryptographic security. (Note: In measuring running time, one
round of interaction with the device is considered a unit time.)
Corollary 1.5 (Cryptographic Security). With the parameters in Corollary 1.4, the running time of the
protocol is T := Θ(2k
µ−ω
). Thus for any λ > 1, setting ω = λ1+λµ, the errors are exp(−Ω(logλ T)),
which are negligible in T. That is, the protocol with those parameters achieves cryptographic quality of
security (while still exponentially expanding.)
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Once we have near perfect randomness as output, we can use it as the input to another in-
stance of the protocol, thus expanding further with an accumulating error parameter. As the error
parameters decrease at an exponential rate, they are dominated by the first set of errors.
Corollary 1.6 (Robust Unbounded Randomness Expansion). For all integers N and k, and any real
ω ∈ (0, µ), k uniformly random bits can be expanded to N output bits with exp(−Ω(kω)) error under a
constant level of noise. The procedure uses O(log∗ N) iterations of Protocol R using O(log∗ N) devices.
To decrease the number of devices used in unbounded expansion, a possibility (used, e.g., in
[Fehr et al., 2013]) is to cross-feed the outputs of two devices (i.e., give the output of one device as
the input to another, and then vice versa). But there is an apparent obstacle for proving security for
such an approach: once a device produces output, this output is now correlated with the device
itself. When this output is fed to a second device to produce new output, one needs to show that
the correlation with the first device does not persist. (If it did, then at the third iteration one would
be feeding the first device a seed that was correlated with the first device itself, thus causing an
insecurity.)
[Coudron and Yuen, 2014] call this the input security problem, and solve it by an improved anal-
ysis of the Reichardt-Unger-Vazirani protocol [Reichardt et al., 2013]. Under this new analysis,
the RUV protocol turns a uniform-to-device input into a globally-uniform output with sufficiently
strong parameters. By interleaving the RUV protocol with the exponentially expanding proto-
col of [Vazirani and Vidick, 2012], they prove non-robust unbounded expansion with 4 two-part
devices.
An independent result of [Chung et al., 2014] can be used to address this problem in a differ-
ent way. The Equivalence Lemma of [Chung et al., 2014] states that if a randomness expansion
protocol is secure with a globally random input, then it is also automatically secure with any
uniform-to-device input. This means that the correlation of each device with its own output does
not cause a problem. Consequently, unbounded expansion with 2 devices can be achieved by
cross-feeding any secure randomness expansion protocol.
We therefore have the following corollary (which is subsequent to [Coudron and Yuen, 2014],
though based on independent techniques). See section 9.
Corollary 1.7 (Robust Unbounded Randomness Expansion with 2 Devices). The number of (multi-
part) devices used in Corollary 1.6 can be reduced to 2.
To apply our protocol to randomness amplification, we can use the results of [Chung et al., 2014].
The amplification protocol in [Chung et al., 2014] requires having a robust randomness certifica-
tion procedure to call as a subroutine; for this, we can use Protocol R with q = Θ(1). The amplifi-
cation protocol converts a n-bit, min-entropy ≥ k weak source to a near perfectly random output
of Θ(k) bits. Thenwe can concatenate with the protocol of Corollary 1.7 to expand to an arbitrarily
long near perfect randomness. (Here the improvement from Corollary 1.6 to Corollary 1.7 implies
that the number of devices need not depend on the output length.)
Corollary 1.8 (with [Chung et al., 2014] — Randomness Amplification). Let ν ∈ [1/2, µ] be a seed
length index. For all sufficiently large integer k, any integer n = exp(O(kν
2
)), any real ǫ = exp(−O(kν2)),
any (n, k) source can be converted to an arbitrarily long near perfect randomness with ǫ soundness and com-
pleteness errors under a (universal) constant level of noise. The number of devices used is 2O(log
1/ν(n/ǫ)),
which in particular does not depend on the output length.
We point out that the number of devices T = T(n, 1/ǫ) used as a function of the weak source
length n and the error parameter ǫ grows super-polynomially (if µ < 1) or polynomially (if
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µ = 1). It remains a major open problem if T(n, 1/ǫ) can be substantially reduced or even be
made a universal constant. We stress, however, that the limitation imposed by this function is
better interpreted as limiting the achievable error, instead of computational efficiency. This is be-
cause, T could still scale efficiently as a function of the output length. For example, to output N
bits, as long as ǫ = exp(−O(logν N)), the number of devices is still polynomial in N. There-
fore, the question of improving T is the question of broadening the application of the combined
amplification-expansion protocol to settings requiring inverse-polynomial or even cryptographic
quality of error.
Lastly, we state our result on quantum key distribution. Suppose that Alice and Bob would
like to establish a shared secret string in an environment where trusted randomness is a scarce re-
source, and consequently their initial randomness is much shorter than the desired output length.
(As with other studies on quantum key distribution (QKD), we will sidestep the authentication
issue, assuming that the man-in-the-middle attack is already dealt with.) One way to adapt our
randomness expansion protocol for untrusted-device QKD scenario is for Alice to expand her
initial randomness, then use the expanded, secure randomness to execute the untrusted device
QKD protocol of Vazirani and Vidick [Vazirani and Vidick, 2014]. The end result is an exponen-
tially expanding key distribution protocol. An alternative approach, which is the focus of our
new contribution, is to directly adapt our expansion protocol to achieve simultaneously random-
ness expansion and key distribution (see Protocol Rkd in Fig. 7). The benefits of doing so is the
reduction of the number of untrusted devices from 2 to 1.
We present the details in section 10 and state our main result on key distribution below. The
notion of soundness and completeness errors are similarly defined: the soundness error is the
distance of the output distribution to a mixture of aborting and an output randomness of a de-
sired smooth min-entropy, and the completeness error is the probability of aborting for an honest
(possibly noisy) implementation.
Corollary 1.9 (Robust Untrusted-Device QKDwith Short Seed). For any strong self-test G, there exist
positive constants r,λ, η, q0 such that for infinitely many positive integers N and any q ≤ q0, Protocol
Rkd (Fig. 7) satisfies the following.
1. (Soundness.) The protocol obtains a key of rN extractable bits with a soundness error
ǫs = exp(−Ω(qN) +O(1)).
2. (Completeness.) For any constant η′, 0 < η′ < η, the protocol tolerates η′ noise level with a
completeness error ǫc = exp(−Ω((η − η′)2qN)).
The number of initial random bits is O(Nh(q) + logN), and the time complexity is polynomial in N.
Thus, for example, if we set q = (log2 N)/N, we can distribute Ω(N) extractable bits using a
seed of size O(log3 N), with error terms achieving cryptographic security. Composing this proto-
col with a quantum-proof randomness extractor that uses a polylogarithmic seed [De et al., 2012]
yields untrusted-device QKD from a polylogarithmic seed.
1.6 Numerical Results
The proof methods in the paper are sufficient to give actual numerical bounds for the amount of
randomness generated by Protocol R. In subsection 8.3 we offer an example showing how this
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is done. If G is a strong self-test, then there is an associated quantity vG > 0 (called the trust
coefficient). Let
π(y) = 1− 2y log
(
1
y
)
− 2(1− y) log
(
1
1− y
)
. (1.1)
We show that if η < vG/2, Protocol R produces π(η/vG)N extractable bits per round, modulo
error terms (see Corollary 8.5). In particular, a positive rate is achieved provided that π(η/vG) >
0, which occurs when η < 0.11 · vG. Subsection 8.3, shows that vGHZ ≥ 0.14. Therefore, the GHZ
game achieves a positive linear rate provided that η < 0.11 · 0.14 = 0.0154.
2 Overview of Proofs
While proving classical security of randomness expansion protocols is mainly appropriate ap-
plications of Azuma-Hoeffiding inequality, proving quantum security is much more challeng-
ing. The proof for the Vazirani-Vidick protocol [Vazirani and Vidick, 2012] relies on a charac-
terization of quantum smooth min-entropy based on the quantum-security of Trevisan’s extrac-
tors [De et al., 2012]. We take a completely different approach, without any reference to extractors
in the main security proof. Below we summarize some of the tools used in our proof, which we
are hopeful will find applications elsewhere.
2.1 Quantum Rényi Entropies
We follow previous work [Tomamichel et al., 2009], [Dupuis et al., 2015] and use the Renyi en-
tropy function Hα(ρ) and Renyi divergence function Dα(ρ‖σ) to lower bound the number of ex-
tractable bits in a classical register with quantum side information. (See subsection 3.2.) Crucially,
we use the newer definition of the quantum Renyi divergence function (the “sandwiched” defini-
tion) which was introduced in [Jaksic et al., 2010] and developed in [Müller-Lennert et al., 2013],
[Wilde et al., 2014].
In [Tomamichel et al., 2009], the authors prove a lower bound on the conditional smooth min-
entropy of n identical copies of a bipartite system ρAB in terms of its relative entropy H(A | B)ρ.
They accomplish this by using the Renyi entropy Hα as an intermediate quantity, exploiting in-
equalities that relate it to both Hǫmin and H, and then using the additive property of Hα. Our proof
incorporates a similar line of reasoning: we prove inductively an upper bound on the Renyi diver-
gence of the outputs of Protocol R (conditioned on the adversary), and then use this to compute a
lower bound for the same outputs expressed in terms of smooth min-entropy.
An challenge in our proofs is choosing the right parameter α. If α is too close to 1, the penalty
term in the inequality that relates Hα to H
ǫ
min will be large enough to make the lower bound on
smoothmin-entropy useless; but if α is too far from 1, the Renyi entropy is not sensitive enough to
detect the effect of rare events, such as the game rounds in Protocol R. The parameter α is therefore
adjusted according to parameters in the Protocol R — roughly speaking, it is set so that α− 1 is
proportional to the parameter q.
Our first original result (Theorem 4.2) is an Renyi entropy uncertainty principle for measure-
ments on an entangled qubit. If QE is a bipartite system where dimQ = 2, let {ρ0, ρ1} and
{ρ+, ρ−} denote the subnormalized states of E that arise from measuring the computational basis
and the Hadamard basis on Q, respectively. Theorem 4.2 expresses uniform constraints (indepen-
dent of the dimension of E) on the quantities Tr[ρ1+ǫx ]. This parallels other known uncertainty
relations [Wehner and Winter, 2010]. The proof is based on a known matrix inequality for the
(2+ 2ǫ)-Schatten norm.
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2.2 Partially Trusted Measurement Simulation
A key insight which enables our proof is that untrusted devices can be used to simulate partially
trusted measurements. Let us say that a device with trusted measurements F is a single-part input-
output device which receives a single bit as an input, and, depending on the value of the bit,
performs one of two perfectly anti-commutative binary measurements on a quantum system. The
measurements of the device are trusted, but the state is unknown. Now consider another single-
part binary device F′ which performs as follows (for some real parameters v, h):
1. On input 0, F′ performs the same measurement as F.
2. On input 1, one of the following occurs at random:
(a) F′ performs the same measurement as D (probability = v);
(b) F′ outputs a perfectly coin flip (probability = h);
(c) F′ performs an unknown measurement (probability = 1− v− h).
The device F′ is what we will call a partially trusted device (see Definition 6.2 for a formal defini-
tion).
Consider the state of the device D after steps 1–3 in Protocol R. Let G1 be a classical register
containing the bit g, and let O1 be a classical register which we set to be 0 if the output is P or H,
and 1 if the output is F or T. We show (sections 5–6) that the joint state of G1O1 can be simulated
by a partially trusted device D′ which accepts G1 as its input and producesO1 as its input. (Here,
“simulation” means that if either device is prepared with an intial purifying system E, the joint
state EG1O1 will be the same up to isomorphism regardless of which device was used.)
We define a new protocol (Protocol A’, Figure 4) which is essentially Protocol R with its device
replaced by a single-part partially trusted device. Proving the security of Protocol R reduces to
proving the security of Protocol A’.
2.3 An Induction Proof With a Weighted Measure of Randomness
The next step is to prove the security of Protocol A′. Let G = (G1, . . . ,GN) and O = (O1, . . . ,ON)
denote registers containing the input bits and output bits, respectively, from Protocol A′, and let
E denote a purifying system for the device in Protocol A′. Let ΓsEGO denote the subnormalized
state of these three systems corresponding to the “success” event (s). Our approach is to prove an
upper bound on the (negative) quantity
Dα (Γ
s
EGO‖ΓEG ⊗ IO) . (2.1)
Another central insight for our proof is the idea of using a weighted measure of randomness.
Consider the first-round registers G1 and O1, and E. The bounding operator ΓEG1 ⊗ IO1 on EG1O1
is equal to
(1− q)ΓE ⊗ |00〉 〈00|+ (1− q)ΓE ⊗ |01〉 〈01|+ (q)ΓE ⊗ |10〉 〈10|+ (q)ΓE ⊗ |11〉 〈11|
Let λ > 0 be a real parameter, and consider the following alternative operator, where we have
inserted the factor 2λ in the fourth summand:
Σ := (1− q)ΓE ⊗ |00〉 〈00|+ (1− q)ΓE ⊗ |01〉 〈01|+ (q)ΓE ⊗ |10〉 〈10|+ (q)2λΓE ⊗ |11〉 〈11| .
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The factor 2λ artificially adds randomness when the event (g, o) = (1, 1) (which corresponds to a
game-loss in Protocol R) occurs. Effectively, we lower our expectation for randomness according
to how well the device is performing.
Our uncertainty principle for Renyi entropy implies that, for appropriate λ, α, the quantity
Dα(ΓEG1O1‖Σ) has a uniform upper bound less than zero. This enables an induction proof which
shows an upper bound on (2.1).
A version of this argument is carried out in section 7. We deduce a lower bound on the number
extractable bits output by Protocol A′. By the reduction discussed above, this implies a lower
bound on the number of extractable bits output by Protocol R (see section 8, Corollary 8.4).
2.4 Quantum Key Distribution
Proving quantum distribution requires first showing that when the noise tolerance in Protocol R
is set sufficiently low, and the protocol succeeds, then the device must score well not only during
game rounds but also during generation rounds. This is accomplished using Azuma’s inequality.
A consequence is that if two parties possess different subsets of the components of the device
D, they can use these devices to construct strings of length N which differ in at most (1/2 −
λ)N places, where λ > 0. We then perform efficient information reconciliation on these strings,
adapting previous work [Guruswami, 2003], [Smith, 2007].
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
When a sequence is defined, we will use Roman font to refer to individual terms (e.g., h1, . . . , hn)
and boldface font to refer to the sequence as a whole (e.g., h). For any bit b, let b = 1− b. For any
sequence of bits b = (b1, . . . , bn), let b = (b1, . . . , bn).
We write the expression f (x)y (where f is a function) to mean ( f (x))y. Thus, for example, in
the expression
Tr[Z]1/q (3.1)
the (1/q)th power map is applied after the trace function, not before it.
We write (log x) to denote the logarithm with base 2, and we write (ln x) to denote the loga-
rithm with base e. We use h : [0, 1] → R to denote the Shannon entropy function:
h(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x). (3.2)
We will use capital letters (e.g., Q) to denote quantum systems. We use the same letter to
denote both the system itself and the complex Hilbert space which represents it. For any finite-
dimensional complex Hilbert space Q, let L(Q) denote the set of linear maps from Q to itself, and
let
P(Q) = {σ ∈ L(Q) | σ ≥ 0} (3.3)
S(Q) = {σ ∈ L(Q) | σ ≥ 0, Tr(σ) ≤ 1} (3.4)
D(Q) = {σ ∈ L(Q) | σ ≥ 0, Tr(σ) = 1}. (3.5)
These are, respectively, the set of positive semidefinite operators, the set of subnormalized positive
semidefinite operators, and the set of density operators.
14
If ρ1 : X1 → Y1 and ρ2 : X2 → Y2 are two linear operators, then we denote by ρ1 ⊕ ρ2 the
operator from X1 ⊕ X2 to Y1 ⊕Y2 which maps (x1, x2) to (ρ1(x1), ρ2(x2)).
If (B, E) is a bipartite system, and ρ is a density operator on B ⊗ E representing a classical-
quantum state, then we may express ρ as a diagonal-block operator
ρ =


ρ1
ρ2
ρ3
. . .
ρm

 , (3.6)
where ρ1, . . . , ρm denote the subnormalized operators on E corresponding to the basis states of the
classical register B. Alternatively, we may express ρ as ρ = ρ1 ⊕ ρ2 ⊕ . . .⊕ ρm.
For any α > 0, and any linear operator X, let ‖X|α denote the Schatten norm:
‖X‖α = Tr[(X∗X)α/2]1/α. (3.7)
Note that if X is positive semidefinite, this may be written more simply as
‖X‖α = Tr[Xα]1/α. (3.8)
We will often be concerned with the function Z 7→ Zx, where x ∈ [0, 2]. We note the following
mathematical properties.
Proposition 3.1. Let γ ∈ [0, 1], and let Z,W denote positive semidefinite operators on Cn.
(a) If Z ≤W, then Zγ ≤Wγ.
(b) If Z ≤W and X = W − Z, then
Tr(X1+γ) + Tr(Z1+γ) ≤ Tr(W1+γ). (3.9)
Proof. Part (a) is given by Theorem 2.6 in [Carlen, 2009]. Part (b) follows from part (a) by the
following reasoning:
Tr(W1+γ) = Tr(W ·Wγ) (3.10)
= Tr(X ·Wγ) + Tr(Z ·Wγ) (3.11)
≥ Tr(X · Xγ) + Tr(Z · Zγ) (3.12)
= Tr(X1+γ) + Tr(Z1+γ). (3.13)
This completes the proof.
3.2 Quantum Rényi Divergence
In this subsection we state the definitions of the two primary measures of randomness used in
this paper (Renyi divergence and smooth min-entropy) and establish their relationship. We quote
the definition of quantum Rényi divergence from [Jaksic et al., 2010], [Müller-Lennert et al., 2013],
[Wilde et al., 2014].
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Definition 3.2 ([Müller-Lennert et al., 2013]). Let ρ be a density matrix on Cn. Let σ be a positive
semidefinite matrix on Cn whose support contains the support of ρ. Let α > 1 be a real number. Then,
dα(ρ‖σ) = Tr
[(
σ
1−α
2α ρσ
1−α
2α
)α] 1α−1
. (3.14)
More generally, for any positive semidefinite matrix ρ′ whose support is contained in Supp σ, let
dα(ρ
′‖σ) = Tr
[
1
Tr[ρ′]
(
σ
1−α
2α ρ′σ
1−α
2α
)α] 1α−1
. (3.15)
Let
Dα(ρ
′‖σ) = log dα(ρ′‖σ). (3.16)
Let AB be a classical quantum system whose state is given by a density operator ρAB. One
way to quantify the amount of randomness in A conditioned on B is via an expression of the form
−Dα(ρAB‖IA ⊗ σB), where σB is a density operator. (Maximizing over expressions of this form
leads to the corresponding notion of conditional Renyi entropy, which will not be used directly in
this paper. See Definition 10 in [Müller-Lennert et al., 2013].)
Note that if ρ is a density matrix, then
Dα(ρ‖I) = − 1
α− 1 log Tr[ρ
α]. (3.17)
For any positive semidefinite operator ρ, let Hα(ρ) := Dα(ρ‖I). This is the unconditional α-Renyi
entropy of ρ.
Additionally, we will need a definition of smooth min-entropy. There are multiple definitions
of smooth min-entropy that are essentially equivalent. The definition that we will use is not the
most up-to-date (see [Tomamichel et al., 2010]) but it is good for our purposes for its simplicity.
Definition 3.3. Let AB be a classical-quantumtum system, and let ρAB be a positive semidefinite operator.
Let ǫ > 0 be a real number. Then,
Hǫmin(A | B)ρ = max‖ρ′−ρ‖1≤ǫ
ρ′∈S(A⊗B)
max
σ∈P(A)
IA⊗σ≥ρ′
− log(Tr(σ)). (3.18)
The smooth min-entropy measures the number of random bits that can be extracted from a
classical source in the presence of quantum information [Renner, 2005]. When it is convenient, we
will use the notation Hǫmin(ρAB|B) instead of Hǫmin(A|B)ρ.
Following [Datta, 2009], let us define the relative smooth max-entropy of two operators.
Definition 3.4. Let ρ, σ be positive semidefinite operators on Cn such that the support of σ contains the
support of ρ. Then,
Dmax(ρ‖σ) = log min
λ∈R
ρ≤λσ
(λ). (3.19)
For any ǫ ≥ 0,
Dǫmax(ρ‖σ) = inf‖ρ′−ρ‖1≤ǫ
ρ′∈S(Cn)
Dmax(ρ
′‖σ). (3.20)
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The quantity Dǫmax is convenient for computing lower bounds on H
ǫ
min. Note that if ψB is any
density matrix on B,
Hǫmin(ρAB|B) ≥ −Dǫmax(ρAB‖IA ⊗ ψB). (3.21)
The following proposition and corollary relate smooth min-entropy to Renyi divergence. The
proof of the proposition is an easy derivative of proofs of similar results ([Tomamichel et al., 2009],
[Dupuis et al., 2015]) and is given in Appendix A.4. The corollary follows easily.
Proposition 3.5. Let α ∈ (1, 2]. Let ρ be a density operator on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space V, and
let σ ∈ P(V) such that Supp σ ⊇ Supp ρ. Then,
Dǫmax(ρ‖σ) ≤ Dα(ρ‖σ) +
2 log(1/ǫ) + 1
α− 1 . (3.22)
Additionally, if ρ is a classical-quantum operator on a bipartite state, then there exists a classical-quantum
operator ρ′ with ‖ρ′ − ρ‖1 ≤ ǫ and ρ′ ≥ 0 such that Dmax(ρ′‖σ) satisfies the above bound.
Corollary 3.6. Let AB be a classical-quantum bipartite system, and let ρAB be a density operator. Let σB
be a density operator on B whose support contains Supp ρB. Let ǫ > 0 and α ∈ (1, 2] be real numbers.
Then, for any ǫ > 0,
Hǫmin (A | B)ρ ≥ −Dα (ρ‖IA ⊗ σB)−
2 log(1/ǫ) + 1
α− 1 . (3.23)
3.3 Quantum Devices
Let us formalize some terminology and notation for describing quantum devices. (Our formal-
ism is a variation on that which has appeared in other papers on untrusted devices, such as
[Reichardt et al., 2013].)
Definition 3.7. Let n be a positive integer. A binary quantum device with n components D =
(D1, . . . ,Dn) consists of the following.
1. Quantum systems Q1, . . . ,Qn whose initial state is specified by a density operator,
Φ : (Q1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Qn) → (Q1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Qn) (3.24)
2. For any k ≥ 0, and any function
T : {0, 1} × {1, 2, . . . , k} × {1, 2, . . . , n} → {0, 1} (3.25)
a unitary operator
UT : (Q1⊗ . . .⊗ Qn) → (Q1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Qn) . (3.26)
and a collection of Hermitian operators{
M
(b)
T,j : Qj → Qj
}
b∈{0,1}
1≤j≤n
(3.27)
satisfying
∥∥∥M(b)T,j∥∥∥ ≤ 1.
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The device D behaves as follows. Suppose that k iterations of the device have already taken
place, and suppose that T is such that T(0, i, j) ∈ {0, 1} and T(1, i, j) ∈ {0, 1} represent the input
bit and output bit, respectively, for the jth player on the ith round (i ≤ k). (T is the transcript
function.) Then,
1. The components D1, . . . ,Dn collectively perform the unitary operationUT on Q1⊗ . . .⊗Qn.
2. Each component Dj receives its input bit bj, then applies the binary nondestructive measure-
ment on Qi given by
X 7→


√√√√I +M(bj)T,j
2

X


√√√√I + M(bj)T,j
2

 (3.28)
X 7→


√√√√I −M(bj)T,j
2

X


√√√√I−M(bj)T,j
2

 , (3.29)
and then outputs the result.
Let us say that one binary quantum device D′ simulates another binary quantum device D if,
for any purifying systems E and E′ (forD and D′, respectively), and any input sequence i1, . . . , ik ∈
{0, 1}n , the joint state of the outputs of D together with E is isomorphic to the joint state of the
outputs of D′ together with E′ on the same input sequence. Similarly, let us say that a protocol X
simulates another protocol Y if, for any purifying systems E and E′ for the quantum devices used
by X and Y, respectively, the joint state of E together with the outputs of X is isomorphic to the
joint state of E’ together with the outputs of Y.
Definition 3.8. Let us say that a binary quantum device D is in canonical form if each of its quantum
systems Qj is such that Qj = C
2m j for some mj ≥ 1, and each measurement operator pair (M(0),M(1)) =
(M
(0)
T,j ,M
(1)
T,j ) has the following 2× 2 diagonal block form:
M(0) =


0 1
1 0
0 1
1 0
. . .
0 1
1 0


M(1) =


0 ζ1
ζ1 0
0 ζ2
ζ2 0
. . .
0 ζm j
ζm j 0


,
where the complex numbers ζℓ satisfy
|ζℓ| = 1 and Im(ζℓ) ≥ 0. (3.30)
(Note that the complex numbers ζℓ may be different for each transcript T and each player j.)
When we discuss quantum devices that are in canonical form, we will frequently make use of
the isomorphism C2m ∼= C2 ⊗ Cm given by e2k−1 7→ e1 ⊗ ek, e2k 7→ e2 ⊗ ek. (Here, e1, . . . , er denote
the standard basis vectors for Cr.)
Proposition 3.9. Any binary quantum device can be simulated by a device that is in canonical form.
Proof. This follows from Theorem A.1 in the appendix.
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4 An Uncertainty Principle
In this section, we consider the behavior of the map ρ 7→ Tr[ρ1+ǫ]whenmeasurements are applied
to a qubit and the operator ρ represents the state of a system that is entangled with the qubit.
We begin by quoting the following theorem, which appears as part of Theorem 5.1 in the paper
[Pisier and Xu, 2003].
Theorem 4.1. Let X,Y : Cm → Cn be linear operators. Let p ≥ 2 be a real number, and let p′ =
1/(1− 1/p). Then,[
1
2
(
‖X + Y‖pp + ‖X −Y‖pp
)]1/p
≤
(
‖X‖p′p + ‖Y‖p
′
p
)1/p′
. (4.1)
Inequality (4.1) may alternatively be expressed as[∥∥∥∥X +Y√2
∥∥∥∥
p
p
+
∥∥∥∥X − Y√2
∥∥∥∥
p
p
]1/p
≤ 21/p−1/2
(
‖X‖p′p + ‖Y‖p
′
p
)1/p′
(4.2)
or, ∥∥∥∥X + Y√2
∥∥∥∥
p
p
+
∥∥∥∥X − Y√2
∥∥∥∥
p
p
≤ 21−p/2
(
‖X‖p′p + ‖Y‖p
′
p
)p/p′
. (4.3)
Observe the following: if QW is a bipartite quantum system with Q = C2 and Λ ∈ D(Q⊗W)
is a density operator, Λ can be written as
Λ =
[
X∗X X∗Y
Y∗X Y∗Y
]
(4.4)
for some X,Y ∈ L(W). Then the reduced state ofW is
ρ := X∗X + Y∗Y (4.5)
Additionally, if we let {ρ0, ρ1} and {ρ+, ρ−} denote the subnormalized states ofW that arise from
measurements on Q along the computational and Hadamard bases, respectively, then
ρ0 = X
∗X (4.6)
ρ1 = Y
∗Y (4.7)
ρ+ =
(
X +Y√
2
)∗ (X + Y√
2
)
, (4.8)
ρ− =
(
X −Y√
2
)∗ (X − Y√
2
)
. (4.9)
Theorem 4.2. There exists a continuous function Π : (0, 1]× [0, 1] → R such that the following holds.
1. Let V be a quantum system, and let ρ, ρ0, ρ0, ρ+, ρ− ∈ S(V) denote operators arising from measure-
ments of a qubit entangled with V. Let
t =
Tr(ρ1+ǫ1 )
Tr(ρ1+ǫ)
. (4.10)
Then, the following inequality always holds:
log
[
Tr(ρ1+ǫ+ + ρ
1+ǫ
− )
Tr(ρ1+ǫ)
]
≤ −ǫΠ(ǫ, t). (4.11)
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2. The limiting function π(z) := lim(x,y)→(0,z) Π(x, y) is given by
π(z) = 1− 2z log
(
1
z
)
− 2(1− z) log
(
1
1− z
)
. (4.12)
Proof. Express the states ρ∗ in terms of operators X and Y as in (4.5–4.9). Applying (4.3) with
p = 2+ 2ǫ, and p′ = 1/(1− 1/p) we have the following:
Tr(ρ1+ǫ+ + ρ
1+ǫ
− ) =
∥∥∥∥X +Y√2
∥∥∥∥
2+2ǫ
2+2ǫ
+
∥∥∥∥X − Y√2
∥∥∥∥
2+2ǫ
2+2ǫ
(4.13)
≤ 21−p/2
(
‖X‖p′p + ‖Y‖p
′
p
)p/p′
(4.14)
= 21−p/2
[(
‖X‖pp
)p′/p
+
(
‖Y‖pp
)p′/p]p/p′
(4.15)
= 2−ǫ
[
Tr
(
ρ1+ǫ0
) 1
1+2ǫ
+ Tr
(
ρ1+ǫ1
) 1
1+2ǫ
]1+2ǫ
(4.16)
Letting
s =
Tr(ρ1+ǫ0 )
Tr(ρ1+ǫ)
, (4.17)
we have
Tr(ρ1+ǫ+ + ρ
1+ǫ
− ) ≤ 2−ǫ
[
s
1
1+2ǫ + t
1
1+2ǫ
]1+2ǫ
Tr(ρ1+ǫ). (4.18)
Since Tr(ρ1+ǫ0 ) + Tr(ρ
1+ǫ
1 ) ≤ Tr(ρ1+ǫ), we have t+ s ≤ 1, and therefore,
Tr(ρ1+ǫ+ + ρ
1+ǫ
− ) ≤ 2−ǫ
[
(1− t) 11+2ǫ + t 11+2ǫ
]1+2ǫ
Tr(ρ1+ǫ). (4.19)
Let
Π(x, y) = −1
x
log
{
2−x
[
(1− y) 11+2x + y 11+2x
]1+2x}
. (4.20)
The desired limiting condition follows using L’Hospital’s rule.
We note that (4.11) can be rewritten as(
−1
ǫ
log Tr(ρ1+ǫ+ + ρ
1+ǫ
− )
)
−
(
−1
ǫ
log Tr(ρ1+ǫ)
)
≥ Π(ǫ, t). (4.21)
The expression on the left side is the difference in (1+ ǫ)-Renyi entropy between the state ρ+ ⊕ ρ−
and the state ρ.
5 The Self-Testing Property of Binary Nonlocal XOR Games
In this section we review some of the known formalism for binary XOR games, and then prove
new results.
20
5.1 Definitions and Basic Results
Definition 5.1. An n-player binary nonlocal XOR game consists of a probability distribution
{pi | i ∈ {0, 1}n} (5.1)
on the set {0, 1}n , together with an indexed set
{ηi ∈ {−1, 1} | i ∈ {0, 1}n}. (5.2)
Given any indexed sets {pi} and {ηi} satisfying the above conditions, we can conduct an n-
player nonlocal game as follows.
1. A referee chooses a binary vector c ∈ {0, 1}n according to the distribution {pi}. For each k,
he gives the bit ck as input to the kth player.
2. Each player returns an output bit dk to the referee.
3. The referee calculates the score, which is given by
ηc(−1)d1+d2+···+dn . (5.3)
If the score is +1, a “pass” has occurred. If the score is −1, a “failure” has occurred.
We quote some definitions and results from [Miller and Shi, 2013] and [Werner and Wolf, 2001].
Definition 5.2. Anmixed n-player quantum strategy is a pair(
Ψ, {{M(0)j ,M(1)j }}nj=1
)
(5.4)
where Ψ is a density matrix on an n-tensor product space V1⊗ . . .⊗Vn and M(i)j denotes a linear operator
on Vj whose eigenvalues are contained in {−1, 1}. A pure n-player quantum strategy is a pair(
ψ, {{M(0)j ,M(1)j }}nj=1
)
(5.5)
which satisfies the same conditions, except that ψ is merely a unit vector on V1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Vn. A qubit
strategy is a pure quantum strategy in which the spaces Vi are equal to C
2 and the operators M
(i)
j are all
nonscalar.
The score achieved by a quantum strategy at an n-player binary nonlocal XOR game G = ({pi}, {ηi})
is the expected score when the qubit strategy is used to play the game G. This quantity can be expressed as
follows. LetM denote the scoring operator for G, which is given by
M = ∑
i∈{0,1}n
piηiM
(i1)
1 ⊗M(i2)2 ⊗ · · · ⊗M(in)n . (5.6)
Then, the score for strategy (5.4) at game G is Tr(MΨ). The score for the pure strategy (5.5) is ψ∗Mψ.
The optimal score for a nonlocal game is the highest score that can be achieved at the game by qubit
strategies. We denote this quantity by qG. (As explained in [Miller and Shi, 2013], this is also the highest
score that can be achieved by arbitrary quantum strategies.) A game G is a self-test if there is only one
qubit strategy (modulo local unitary operations on the n tensor components of
(
C2
)⊗n
) which achieves the
optimal score. A game G iswinnable if qG = 1.
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Note that qG is different from the maximum passing probability for quantum strategies, which we
denote by wG. The two are related by wG = (1+ qG)/2. We will also write fG for the minimum failing
probability, which is given by fG = 1−wG.
We define functions that are useful for the study of binary XOR games. For any nonlocal game G =
({pi}, {ηi}), define PG : Cn → C by
PG(λ1, . . . ,λn) = ∑
i∈{0,1}n
piηiλ
i1
1 λ
i2
2 . . . λ
in
n . (5.7)
Define ZG : R
n+1 → R by
ZG(θ0, θ1, . . . , θn) = ∑
i∈{0,1}n
piηi cos
(
θ0 +
n
∑
k=1
ikθk
)
. (5.8)
These functions are related by
ZG(θ0, . . . , θn) = Re
[
eiθ0P(eiθ1 , eiθ2 , . . . , eiθn)
]
. (5.9)
|PG(eiθ1 , . . . , eiθn)| = max
θ0∈[−π,π]
ZG(θ0, . . . , θn). (5.10)
The functions PG and ZG can be used to calculate qG. This was observed by Werner and Wolf
in [Werner and Wolf, 2001]. We sketch a proof here. (For a more detailed proof, see Proposition 1
in [Miller and Shi, 2013].)
Proposition 5.3. For any nonlocal binary XOR game G, the following equalities hold.
qG = max|λ1|=...=|λn|=1
∣∣Pg(λ1, . . . ,λn)∣∣ (5.11)
= max
θ0 ,...,θn∈R
Zg(θ0, . . . , θn). (5.12)
sketch. Let (ψ, {M(i)j }) be a qubit strategy for G. By an appropriate choice of basis, wemay assume
that
M
(0)
j =
[
0 1
1 0
]
and M
(1)
j =
[
0 ζ j
ζ j 0
]
. (5.13)
where {ζ j} are complex numbers of length 1. The scoring operatorM can be expressed as a reverse
diagonal matrix whose entries are{
PG(ζ
b1
1 , . . . , ζ
bn
n )
}
(b1,...,bn)∈{−1,1}n
. (5.14)
The eigenvalues of a reverse diagonal Hermitian matrix whose reverse-diagonal entries are equal
to z1, z2, . . . , z2n is simply ±|z1|,±|z2|, . . . ,±|zn|. Therefore the operator norm of M is the maxi-
mum absolute value that occurs in (5.14).
The value q f is the maximum of the operator norm that occurs among all the scoring operators
arising from qubit strategies for G. The desired formulas follow.
Proposition 5.4. Let G be a nonlocal binary XOR game. Then, G is a self-test if and only if the following
two conditions are satisfied.
22
(A) There is a maximum (α0, . . . , αn) for ZG such that none of α1, . . . , αn is a multiple of π.
(B) Every other maximum of ZG is congruent modulo 2π to either (α0, . . . , αn) or (−α0, . . . ,−αn).
Proof. See Proposition 2 in [Miller and Shi, 2013].
The following definition will be convenient in later proofs.
Proposition 5.5. Let G be a nonlocal game which is a self-test. Then, G is positively aligned if a maxi-
mum for ZG(θ0, . . . , θn) occurs in the region
{(θ0, . . . , θn) | 0 < θi < π ∀i ≥ 1} . (5.15)
For any binary XOR self-test G = ({pi}, {ηi}), we can construct a positively aligned self-test
G′ = ({p′i}, {η′i}) by setting b1, . . . , bn ∈ {0, 1} so that bi = 0 if ZG has a maximum with θi ∈ (0,π),
and bi = 1 if not, and letting
p′i = pi (5.16)
η′i = η(i+b)mod 2. (5.17)
It is easy to see that qG′ = qG.
Definition 5.6. Let (ψ, {M(i)j ) and (φ, {N(i)j }) be n-player qubit strategies. Then the distance between
these two strategies is the quantity
max
(
{‖ψ− φ‖} ∪
{∥∥∥M(i)j − N(i)j ∥∥∥ | j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, i ∈ {0, 1}}) . (5.18)
(In this formula, the first norm denotes Euclidean distance and second denotes operator norm.) Let G be a
self-test. Then, G is a strong self-test if there exists a constant K such that any qubit strategy that achieves
a score of qG − ǫ is within distance K
√
ǫ from a qubit strategy that achieves the score qG.
For any twice differentiable m-variable function F : Rm → R, and any c = (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ Rm,
we can define the Hessian matrix for F at c, which is the m × m matrix formed from the second
partial derivatives
∂2F
∂xi∂xj
(c1, . . . , cm) (5.19)
(for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}).
Proposition 5.7. Let G be an n-player self-test. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
1. G is a strong self-test.
2. The function ZG has nonzero Hessian matrices at all of its maxima.
3. There exists a constant K > 0 such that any (β0, . . . , βn) ∈ Rn+1 which satisfies
ZG(β0, . . . , βn) ≥ qG − ǫ
(with ǫ ≥ 0) must be within distance K√ǫ from a maximum of ZG.
Proof. (1) ⇐⇒ (2) is Proposition 3 in [Miller and Shi, 2013]. (2)⇐⇒ (3) follows from an easy cal-
culus argument.
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We next prove a proposition and corollary which state consequences of the strong self-testing
conditions. These will be the basis for proofs in subsection 5.2.
Proposition 5.8. Let G be a positively-aligned strong self-test. Let H denote the semicircle {eiβ | 0 ≤ β ≤
π} ⊆ C. Then, there exists α ∈ [−π,π] and c ≥ 0 such that the set
PG(H
n) ⊆ C (5.20)
is bounded by the polar curve
f : [−π,π] → C (5.21)
f (θ) = (qG − c(θ − α)2)eiθ .
Proof. Since G is positively aligned, wemay find amaximum (α0, . . . , αn) for ZG such that α1, . . . , αn ∈
(0,π). Choose K according to condition (3) from Proposition 5.7. Let c = 1/K2 and α = −α0.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is a point in the set Pf (H
n)which lies outside
of (5.21). Then, there exists β1, . . . , βn ∈ [0,π] such that
Pf (e
iβ1 , . . . , eiβn) = reiθ (5.22)
(with θ ∈ [−π,π]) and
r > qG − c(θ − α)2. (5.23)
Let ǫ = (1/K2)(θ − α)2. We have
ZG(−θ, β1, . . . , βn) = r > qG − c(θ − α)2 (5.24)
= qG − ǫ, (5.25)
and the distance between (−θ, β1, . . . , βn) and (α0, . . . , αn) is at least |θ − α| = K
√
ǫ. (And, it is
easy to see that (−θ, β1, . . . , βn) is not any closer to any of the other maxima of ZG than it is to
(α0, . . . , αn).) This contradicts condition (3) of Proposition 5.7.
Corollary 5.9. Let G satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 5.8. Then, there exists a complex number
γ 6= 0 such that for all ζ1, . . . , ζn ∈ H,
|PG(ζ1, . . . , ζn)− γ|+ |γ| ≤ qG. (5.26)
Proof. Let R ⊆ C be the region enclosed by the polar curve (5.21). Let S = {z ∈ C | |z| = qG}.
We have S ∩ R = {qG · eiα}. Since the curvature of the curve (5.21) at eiα is strictly greater than
1/qG, we can find a circle of radius less than qG which lies inside of S, which is tangent to S at
qG · eiα, and which encloses the region R. Then, if we let γ be the center of this circle, we have
|z− γ|+ |γ| ≤ qG for all z ∈ R. The desired inequality follows.
5.2 Decomposition Theorems
This subsection proves results on the measurements that are simulated by strong self-tests. For
any unit-length complex number ζ, let us write gζ for the following modified GHZ state:
gζ =
1√
2
(|00 . . . 0〉+ ζ |11 . . . 1〉) . (5.27)
The next theorem uses the canonical form for binary measurements from subsection 3.3. Note
that when a collection of four projections {P(b,c)} is in canonical form over a space C2m, we can
naturally express them as operators on C2 ⊗ Cm via the isomorphism C2m → C2 ⊗ Cm given by
e2k−1 7→ e1 ⊗ ek, e2k 7→ e2 ⊗ ek.
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Theorem 5.10. Let G = ({pi}, {ηi}) be awinnable n-player self-test which is such that
1. G is positively aligned, and
2. p00...0 > 0 and η00...0 = 1.
Then, there exists a constant δG > 0 such that the following holds. Let (Φ, {M(i)j }) be a quantum strategy
whose measurements are in canonical form with underlying space (C2 ⊗W1) ⊗ . . . ⊗ (C2 ⊗Wn). Then
the scoring operator M can be decomposed as
M = δGM
′ + (1− δG)M′′, (5.28)
where ‖M′′‖ ≤ 1, and
M′ = (g1g∗1 − g−1g∗−1)⊗ IW1⊗···⊗Wn. (5.29)
Proof. Let
T+ =
{
(θ0, . . . , θn) ∈ Rn+1 | θi > 0 ∀i ≥ 1
}
, (5.30)
and
T− =
{
(θ0, . . . , θn) ∈ Rn+1 | θi < 0 ∀i ≥ 1
}
, (5.31)
Let q′G be the maximum value of ZG that occurs on the set [−π,π]n+1 r (T+ ∪ T−). By the criteria
from Proposition 5.4, this set does not include any of the global maxima for the function ZG, and
so q′G is strictly smaller than the overall maximum qG = 1. Let
δG = min
{
p00...0, qG − q′G
}
, (5.32)
where p00...0 denotes the probability which G associates to the input string 00 . . . 0.
First let us address the case where dimWj = 1 for all j. Then
M
(0)
j =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, (5.33)
M
(1)
j =
[
0 ζ j
ζ j 0
]
. (5.34)
We can compute the scoring operator M using formula (5.6). When we write this operator as
a matrix, using the computational basis for (C2)⊗n in lexicographical order, we obtain a reverse
diagonal matrix,
M =


a00...0
a00...1
. .
.
a11...0
a11...1

 (5.35)
where
ab1,...,bn = PG(ζ
(−1)b1
1 , ζ
(−1)b2
2 , . . . , ζ
(−1)bn
n ). (5.36)
25
By canonical form, we have ζ j = e
iθj for some θj ∈ [0,π]. Note that can write
|ab1,...,bn | = max
θ0∈R
ZG(θ0, (−1)b1θ1, (−1)b2θ2, . . . , (−1)bnθn). (5.37)
By the definition of q′G, all of the values |ab| are bounded by q′G except possibly |a00...0| and |a11...1|,
which are both bounded by qG = 1.
We claim that the matrix
N =


a00...0 − δG
a00...1
. .
.
a11...0
a11...1 − δG

 (5.38)
which arises from subtracting δG from the two corner entries of M, has operator norm less than
or equal to 1− δG. Indeed, the operator norm of this Hermitian matrix is the maximum of the
absolute values of its entries, and we already know that all of its entries other than its corner
entries are bounded by q′G ≤ 1− δG. To show that that the absolute values of the corner entries
are bounded by 1− δG, it suffices to write them out in terms of the parameters of the game G: we
have
|a00...0 − δG| = |PG(ζ1, . . . , ζn)− δG| (5.39)
=
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∑
i∈{0,1}n
ηipiζ
i1
1 ζ
i2
2 · . . . ζ inn
)
− δG
∣∣∣∣∣ (5.40)
=
∣∣∣∣∣(p0 − δG) + ∑
i 6=0
ηipiζ
i1
1 ζ
i2
2 · . . . ζ inn
∣∣∣∣∣ (5.41)
≤ (p0 − δG) + ∑
i 6=0
pi (5.42)
= 1− δG, (5.43)
and likewise for (a11...1 − δG). We conclude that N has operator norm less than or equal to 1− δG.
LetM′′ = N/(1− δG) andM′ = (M−N′)/δG, and the desired conditions hold.
The proof for the case in which W1, . . . ,Wn are of arbitrary dimension follows by similar rea-
soning.
Theorem 5.11. Let G = ({pi} , {ηi}) be a strong self-test which is positively aligned. Then, there exist
δG > 0 and α ∈ C with |α| = 1 such that the following holds. Let (Φ, {M(i)j }) be a quantum strategy
whose measurements are in canonical form with underlying space (C2 ⊗W1) ⊗ . . . ⊗ (C2 ⊗Wn). Then
the scoring operator M can be decomposed as
M = δGM
′ + (qG − δG)M′′, (5.44)
where ‖M′′‖ ≤ 1, and
M′ = (gαg∗α − g−αg∗−α)⊗ IW1⊗···⊗Wn. (5.45)
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Proof. We repeat elements of the proof of Theorem 5.10. It suffices to prove our desired decompo-
sition for the case in which dimWi = 1 for all i. Let q
′
G be the maximum value of ZG that occurs
on the set [−π,π]n+1 r (T+ ∪ T−) (where T+ and T− are defined by (5.30) and (5.31)). Let γ 6= 0
be the constant that is given by Corollary 5.9, and let
δG = min{|γ|, qG − q′G}. (5.46)
We have
M =


a00...0
a00...1
. .
.
a11...0
a11...1

 (5.47)
where
ab1,...,bn = PG(ζ
(−1)b1
1 , ζ
(−1)b2
2 , . . . , ζ
(−1)bn
n ). (5.48)
for some ζ1, . . . , ζn ∈ C such that |ζi| = 1 and Im(ζi) ≥ 0. By Corollary 5.9,
|PG(ζ1, . . . , ζn)− γ|+ |γ| ≤ qG, (5.49)
and it is easy to see (by the triangle inequality) that for any c ∈ [0, 1],
|PG(ζ1, . . . , ζn)− cγ|+ |cγ| ≤ qG. (5.50)
Let
N =


a00...0 − δG|γ| · γ
a00...1
. .
.
a11...0
a11...1 − δG|γ| · γ


(5.51)
The absolute values of the corner entries of this matrix are less than or equal to qG − δG, and the
other entries have absolute values less than or equal to q′G ≤ qG − δG. Thus when we set
α = γ/|γ|, (5.52)
M′ = (gαg∗α − g−αg∗−α)⊗ IW1⊗···⊗Wn, (5.53)
M′′ = (M− δGM′)/(qG − δG), (5.54)
the desired result follows.
The operator (gαg∗α − g−αg∗−α) from the statement of Theorem 5.11 does not describe a pro-
jective measurement. It is convenient to have a decomposition theorem involving a projective
measurement. This motivates the next result.
We introduce some additional notation. Let
b : {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2n − 1} → {0, 1}n (5.55)
be the function which maps k to its base-2 representation. For any ζ ∈ C with |ζ| = 1, and any
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2n − 1}, let
gζ,k =
1√
2
(
|b(k)〉 〈b(k)|+ ζ
∣∣∣b(k)〉 〈b(k)∣∣∣) . (5.56)
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Theorem 5.12. Let G = ({pi} , {ηi}) be a strong self-test which is positively aligned. Then, there exist
δG > 0 and α ∈ C with |α| = 1 such that the following holds. Let (Φ, {M(i)j }) be a quantum strategy
whose measurements are in canonical form with underlying space (C2 ⊗W1) ⊗ . . . ⊗ (C2 ⊗Wn). Let
α0 = α and let α1, . . . , α2n−1−1 be any unit-length complex numbers. Then the scoring operator M can be
decomposed as
M = δGM
′ + (qG − δG)M′′, (5.57)
where ‖M′′‖ ≤ 1, and
M′ =
[
2n−1−1
∑
k=0
(gαk,kg
∗
αk,k
− g−αk,kg∗−αk,k)
]
⊗ IW1⊗···⊗Wn . (5.58)
Proof. Again it suffices to prove this result for when dimWi = 1 for all i. Let q
′
G be the maximum
value of ZG that occurs on the set [−π,π]n+1 r (T+ ∪ T−), where T+ and T− are defined by (5.30)
and (5.31). Let γ be the constant given by Corollary 5.9, let α = γ/|γ|, and let
δG = min{|γ| ,
(
qG − q′G
)
/2}. (5.59)
WriteM as
M =


a00...0
a00...1
. .
.
a11...0
a11...1

 (5.60)
Let
N = M− δG


α0
α1
. .
.
α2n−1−1
α2n−1−1
. .
.
α1
α0


, (5.61)
The corner entries of N have absolute value ≤ qG − δG (by Corollary 5.9) and the same holds for
the other anti-diagonal entries by the triangle inequality: for any n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2N−1 − 1},∣∣∣ab(n) − δGαn∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ab(n)∣∣∣+ δG ≤ q′G + (qG − q′G)/2 ≤ qG − δG. (5.62)
Thus we letM′′/(qG − δG) and the desired statements hold.
6 Randomness Expansion with Partially Trusted Measurements
The goals of this section are to define randomness expansion protocols based on partially trusted
devices, and then to relate these new protocols to Protocol R.
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6.1 Devices with Trusted Measurements
We begin by stating a simple protocol that involves a device with trusted measurements.
Definition 6.1. A device with trusted measurements consists of the following data.
1. A single quantum system Q in an initial state Φ.
2. For every pair (i, o) of binary strings of equal length, two Hermitian operators M
(0)
i,o ,M
(1)
i,o repre-
senting the measurements performed on Q when the input and output histories are i and o. These
operators are assumed to satisfy (
M
(0)
i,o
)2
=
(
M
(1)
i,o
)2
= I (6.1)
and
M
(0)
i,o M
(1)
i,o = −M(1)i,oM(0)i,o . (6.2)
A trusted measurement device is one whose measurements perfectly anti-commute. A proto-
col for trusted measurement devices is given in Figure 3. Essentially this protocol is the same as
Protocol R, except that we have skipped the process of generating random inputs for the game
rounds, and have instead simply used the biased coin flip g itself as input to the device.
6.2 Devices with Partially Trusted Measurements
Definition 6.2. Let v ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈ [0, 1] be real numbers such that v + h ≤ 1. Then a partially
trusted device with parameters (v, h) consists of the following data.
1. A single quantum system Q in an intial state Φ.
2. For every pair (i, o) of binary strings of equal length, two Hermitian operators M
(0)
i,o ,M
(1)
i,o on Q
(representing measurements) that satisfy the following conditions:
• There exist perfectly anti-commuting measurement pairs (T
(0)
i,o , T
(1)
i,o ) such that M
(0)
i,o = T
(0)
i,o for
all i, o, and
• The operator M
(1)
i,o decomposes as
M
(1)
i,o = (v)T
(1)
i,o + (1− v− h)Ni,o (6.3)
with ‖Ni,o‖ ≤ 1.
The operators M
(0)
i,o ,M
(1)
i,o determine the measurements performed by the device on inputs 0
and 1, respectively. Intuitively, a partially trusted device is a device D which always performs a
trusted measurement T(0) on input 0, and on input 1, selects one of the three operators (T(1),N, 0)
at random according to the probability distribution (v, 1− v− h, h).
We will call the parameter v the trust coefficient, and we will call h the coin flip coefficient.
The parameter h measures the extent to which the output of D on input 1 is determined by a fair
coin flip. Note that when the input to the device D is 1, then the probability that D gives an output
of 1 is necessarily between h/2 and (1− h/2).
Figure 4 gives a randomness expansion protocol for partially trusted devices. It is the same as
Protocol A, except that the trusted device has been replaced by a partially trusted device.
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Protocol A:
Arguments:
N = positive integer
q ∈ (0, 1)
η ∈ (0, 1/2)
D = device with trusted measurements
1. A bit g ∈ {0, 1} is chosen according to a biased (1− q, q) distribution.
The bit g is given to D as input, and an output bit o is recorded.
2. If g = 1 and the output given by D is 0, then the event P (“pass”) is
recorded. If g = 1 and the output is 1, the event F (“fail”) is recorded.
3. If g = 0 and the output given by D is 0, then the event H (“heads”) is
recorded. If g = 0 and the output is 1, the event T (“tails”) is recorded.
4. Steps 1 − 3 are repeated N − 1 (more) times. Bit sequences g =
(g1, . . . , gN) and o = (o1, . . . , oN) are obtained.
5. If the total number of failures is more than ηqN, the protocol aborts.
Otherwise, the protocol succeeds. If the protocol succeeds, it outputs the
bit sequences g and o.
Figure 3: A randomness expansion protocol for a trusted measurement device.
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Protocol A’:
Arguments:
v = real number such that v ∈ (0, 1].
h = real number such that h ∈ [0, 1− v].
N = positive integer
q ∈ (0, 1)
η ∈ (0, v/2)
D = partially trusted device with parameters (v, h).
1. A bit g ∈ {0, 1} is chosen according to a biased (1− q, q) distribution.
The bit g is given to D as input, and the output bit o is recorded.
2. If g = 1 and the output given by D is 0, then the event P (“pass”) is
recorded. If g = 1 and the output is 1, the event F (“fail”) is recorded.
3. If g = 0 and the output given by D is 0, then the event H (“heads”) is
recorded. If g = 0 and the output is 0, the event T (“tails”) is recorded.
4. Steps 1 − 3 are repeated N − 1 (more) times. Bit sequences g =
(g1, . . . , gN) and o = (o1, . . . , oN) are obtained.
5. If the total number of failures is greater than (h/2+ η)qN, then the pro-
tocol aborts. Otherwise, the protocol succeeds. If the protocol succeeds,
it outputs the bit sequences g and o.
Figure 4: A randomness expansion protocol for a partially trusted device.
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6.3 Entanglement with a Partially Trusted Measurement Device
Suppose that D is a partially trusted measurement device (see Definition 6.2) with parameters
(v, h). Suppose that E is a quantum system that is entangled with D, and let ρ = ρE denote the
initial state of E. We will use the following notation: let ρ+ and ρ− denote the subnormalized
operators which represent the states of E when the input bit is 0 and the output bit is 0 or 1,
respectively. Let ρP and ρF denote the operators which represent an input of 1 and an output of 0
or 1, respectively. Also (using notation fromDefinition 6.2), let us write ρ0 and ρ1 denote the states
of E that would occur if the trusted measurement T(1) was applied to Q (instead of the partially
trusted measurement M(1)). (Note that T(1) is perfectly anticommuting with M(0).)
The following proposition expresses the possible behavior of the system E.
Proposition 6.3. Let v ∈ (0, 1] and h ∈ [0, 1] be such that v+ h ≤ 1. Let D be a partially trusted device
with parameters (v, h), let E be a quantum system that is entangled with D, and let ρ = ρE. Then,
(h/2)ρ+ vρ0 ≤ ρP ≤ (1− h/2)ρ − vρ1 (6.4)
and
(h/2)ρ+ vρ1 ≤ ρF ≤ (1− h/2)ρ− vρ0. (6.5)
Proof. Let N be the measurement operator from the decomposition of M(1) given in Definition 6.2.
Let ρ′ be the subnormalized operator on E which denotes the state that would be produced if N
were applied to Q and the outcome were 0. Clearly, 0 ≤ ρ′ ≤ ρ. From the decomposition (6.3), ρP
is a convex combination of the operators ρ0, ρ
′ and (ρ/2):
ρP = vρ0 + (1− v− h)ρ′ + h(ρ/2). (6.6)
Since ρ′ ≤ ρ, we have
ρP ≤ vρ0 + (1− v− h)ρ+ h(ρ/2) (6.7)
= vρ0 + (1− v− h/2)ρ (6.8)
= (1− h/2)ρ+ v(ρ0 − ρ) (6.9)
= (1− h/2)ρ− vρ1. (6.10)
The other inequalities follow similarly.
6.4 Simulation
To any binary XOR game G, we have associated three quantities: qG,wG, and fG. These are re-
spectively the optimal quantum score, optimal quantum winning probability, and least quantum
failure probability for G. The quantities are related by wG = (1+ qG)/2 and fG = 1−wG.
Theorem 6.4. For any n-player strong self-test G which is positively aligned, there exists δG > 0 such that
the following holds. For any any n-part binary quantum device D, there exists a partially trusted device
D′ with parameters qG, δG such that Protocol A’ (with arguments δG, 2fG,N, q, η,D′) simulates Protocol
R (with arguments N, η, q,G,D).
Proof. Choose δG according to Theorem 5.12.
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Consider the behavior of the device D in the first round. We may assume that the measure-
ments performed by D1, . . . ,Dn are in canonical form. Write the underlying space as (C
2⊗W1)⊗
· · · ⊗ (C2 ⊗Wn). If g = 0, the measurement performed by D1 is given by the operator

1
1
. . .
1
1
1
. . .
1


⊗ IW1⊗···⊗Wn (6.11)
(where the matrix on the left is an operator on
(
C2
)⊗n
, with the basis taken in lexiographic order
as usual).
If g = 1 the measurement performed by D is given by the scoring operatorM. Theorem 5.12
guarantees that for some unit-length complex number α, and for any choices of unit-length com-
plex numbers α1, . . . , α2n−1−1, there is a decomposition forM in the formM = δGM′+(qG− δG)M′′
with
M′ =


α
α1
. .
.
α2n−1−1
α2n−1−1
. .
.
α1
α


⊗ IW1⊗···⊗Wn
and ‖M′′‖ ≤ 1. To simulate the behavior of Dwith a partially trusted device, we need only choose
α1, . . . , α2n−1−1 so that M′ is perfectly anti-commutative with the operator 6.11. This can be done,
for example, by setting α1, α2, . . . , α2n−2−1 to be equal to α, and α2n−2 , . . . , α2n−1+1 to be equal to −α.
Thus the behavior of the device D in the first round of Protocol R can be simulated by a partially
trusted device with parameters (δG, 1 − qG) = (δG, 2fG). Similar reasoning shows the desired
simulation result across all rounds.
The following corollary is easy to prove.
Corollary 6.5. Theorem 6.4 holds true without the assumption that G is positively aligned.
Essentially, the above corollary implies that any security result for Protocol A’ can be converted
immediately into an identical security result for Protocol R. This will be the basis for our eventual
full proof of randomness expansion.
7 The Proof of Security for Partially Trusted Devices
In this section we provide the proof of security for Protocol A’ (see Figure 4). Our approach,
broadly stated, is as follows: we show the existence of a function T(v, h, η, q, κ) which provides
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N ∈ N number of rounds
q ∈ (0, 1) test probability
t ∈ [0, 1] failure parameter
v ∈ (0, 1] trust coefficient
h ∈ [0, 1− v] coin flip coefficient
η ∈ (0, v/2) error tolerance
κ ∈ (0,∞) failure penalty
r ∈ (0, 1/(qκ)] multiplier for Rényi coefficient
ǫ ∈ (0,√2] error parameter for smooth min-entropy
Figure 5: Variables used in section 7.
a lower bound on the linear rate of entropy of the protocol. (The variables v, h, η, q are from the
protocol, and κ is a positive constant that can be chosen to be arbitrarily small.) The main point of
our proofs is that, although T depends on several variables, it does not depend on the particular
device used in Protocol A’. Thus, we have a uniform security result.
The definition of T is multi-layered and is developed over the course of the section. For the
reader’s convenience, we have collected all the definitions of the functions that we use, including
T, in appendix subsection A.3. The full expression for T is quite complicated, but for our purposes
it suffices to calculate the limit lim(q,κ)→(0,0) T(v, h, η, q, κ), since this will tell us what rate Protocol
A′ approaches when q is small. This limit will be shown to be equal to π(η/v), where π denotes
the function from Theorem 4.2.
Our proof involves several parameters. For convenience, we include a table herewhich assigns
a name to each parameter (Figure 5.)
To avoid unnecessary repetition, we will use the following conventions in this section.
• Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that the variables from Figure 5 are always re-
stricted to the domains given. (The reader can assume that all unquantified statements are
prefaced by, “for all q ∈ (0, 1], all ǫ ∈ (0,√2),” etc.) If we say “F(q, κ) is a real-valued func-
tion,” we mean that it is a real valued function on (0, 1) × (0,∞). If we say “let x = κq,”
we mean that x is a real valued function on (0, 1) × (0,∞) defined by x(κ, q) = κq. If the
domain of one parameter of a function depends on another variable (as can occur, e.g., for
the variable h) we always include the other variable as a parameter of the function.
• When we discuss a single iteration of Protocol A’, will use notation from subsection 6.3: If D
is a partially trustedmeasurement device, and E is a purifying system for Dwith initial state
ρ = ρE, then ρ = ρH + ρT and ρ = ρP + ρF denote the decompositions that occur for a single
use of the device on input 0 and 1, respectively. We denote by ρ+, ρ−, ρ0, ρ1 the respective
states that would occur if the corresponding fully trusted measurements were used instead.
(Note that ρH = ρ+ and ρT = ρ−.) Let ρ denote the operator on E⊕ E⊕ E⊕ E given by
ρ = (1− q)ρH ⊕ (1− q)ρT ⊕ qρP ⊕ qρF. (7.1)
This operator represents the state of E taken together with the input bit and output bit from
the first iteration of Protocol A’.
• When we discuss multiple iterations of Protocol A’, we will use the following notation: let
G and O denote classical registers which consist of the bit sequences g = (g1, . . . , gN) and
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o = (o1, . . . , on), respectvely. We denote basis states for the joint system GO by |go〉. We
denote the joint state of the system EGO at the conclusion of Protocol A’ by ΓEGO.
• If D is a partially trusted measurement device, E is a purifying system, and α > 0, then we
refer to the quantity
Tr(ρα1)
Tr(ρα)
∈ [0, 1] (7.2)
as the α-failure parameter of D. (Note that we used the operator ρ1 in the above expression,
not the operator ρF. This parameter measures “honest” failures only.)
• Let Π(x, y) and π(y) denote the functions from Theorem 4.2.
7.1 Proof Idea
Let D be a partially trusted measurement device with parameters v, h, and let E be a purifying
system with initial state ρ. Let ρ be the operator on E⊕ E⊕ E⊕ E which represents the joint state
of E together with the input and output of a single iteration of Protocol A’:
ρ = (1− q)ρH ⊕ (1− q)ρT ⊕ qρP ⊕ qρF. (7.3)
We wish to show that the state ρ is more random than the original state ρ. Therefore, we wish to
show that the ratio
d1+γ(ρ‖σ)
d1+γ(ρ‖σ) , (7.4)
for some appropriate γ, σ, σ, is significantly smaller than 1. For simplicity, we will for the time
being take σ = I for the initial bounding operator. (Later in this section we will generalize this
choice.)
A natural choice of bounding operator for ρ would be
(1− q)I⊕ (1− q)I⊕ qI ⊕ qI. (7.5)
Computing d1+γ(ρ‖·) with this bounding operator would yield
{
(1− q)Tr[ρ1+γ+ ] + (1− q)Tr[ρ1+γ− ] + qTr[ρ1+γP ] + qTr[ρ1+γF ]
}1/γ
(7.6)
Computing this quantity would have the effect, roughly speaking, of measuring the randomness
of the output bit of Protocol A’ conditioned on E and on the input bit g. However this is not
adequate for our purposes, since it treats “passing” rounds the same as “failing” rounds, and does
not take into account that the device is only allowed a limited number of failures. (And indeed,
this measurement of randomness does not work: if D performs anticommuting measurements
on a half of a maximally entangled qubit pair, the divergence quantity d1+γ(ρ‖·) with bounding
operator (7.5) is the same as d1+γ(ρ‖I).)
We will use a slightly different expression to measure the output of Protocol A’. We introduce
a single cofficient 2−κ (with κ > 0) into the fourth term of the expression:
{
(1− q)Tr[ρ1+γ+ ] + (1− q)Tr[ρ1+γ− ] + qTr[ρ1+γP ] + q2−κTr[ρ1+γF ]
}1/γ
(7.7)
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The reason for the introduction of the coefficient 2−κ is this: in effect, if a game round occurs and
the device fails, we lower our expectation for the amount of randomness produced. The quantity
(7.7) is equal to d1+γ(ρ‖σ) where
σ = (1− q)I⊕ (1− q)I ⊕ qI⊕ q2κ/γI. (7.8)
Having chosen the bounding operator σ, we need only to choose the coefficient γ ∈ (0, 1]. We
will take γ to be of the form γ = rqκ, where r ∈ (0, 1/(qκ)].4 (Expressing γ this way enables clean
calculations in our proofs.)
The proof proceeds by showing an upper bound on (7.4), then applying induction to get a
similar upper bound for N uses of the device, and then applying the relationship between Renyi
divergence and smooth min-entropy to get a lower bound on the number of extractable bits pro-
duced by Protocol A′.
7.2 One-Shot Results
We begin by proving a one-shot security result under the assumption that some limited informa-
tion about the device is available.
Proposition 7.1. There is a continuous real-valued function Λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t) such that the following con-
ditions hold.
1. Let D be a partially trusted measurement device with parameters (v, h), and let E be a purifying
system for D. Let γ = rqκ, and let
σ = (1− q)I ⊕ (1− q)I ⊕ qI ⊕ q2κ/γI. (7.9)
Then,
d1+γ(ρ‖σ) ≤ 2−Λ(v,h,q,κ,r,t) · d1+γ(ρ‖I), (7.10)
where t = Tr(ρ1+γ1 )/Tr(ρ
1+γ) denotes the (1+ γ)-failure parameter of D.
2. The following limit condition is satisfied: for any t0 ∈ [0, 1],
lim
(q,κ,t)→(0,0,t0)
Λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t) = π(t0) +
h/2+ vt0
r
, (7.11)
where π is the function from Theorem 4.2.
Proof. We have
d1+γ(ρ‖σ) ={
(1− q)Tr[ρ1+γ+ ] + (1− q)Tr[ρ1+γ− ] + qTr[ρ1+γP ] + q2−κTr[ρ1+γF ]
}1/γ
(7.12)
We will compute a bound on this quantity by grouping the first and second summands together,
and then by grouping the third and fourth summands together. Note that by Theorem 4.2, we
have
Tr[ρ1+γ+ ] + Tr[ρ
1+γ
− ] ≤ 2−γΠ(γ,t)Tr[ρ1+γ] (7.13)
4The reason for this choice of interval for r is that we need γ ≤ 1 for the application of results from section 3.2.
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Now consider the sum Tr[ρ1+γP ] + 2
−κTr[ρ1+γF ]. By superaddivity (see Proposition 3.1),
Tr[ρ1+γP ] + 2
−κTr[ρ1+γF ] = Tr
[
2−κ(ρ1+γP + ρ
1+γ
F ) + (1− 2−κ)ρ1+γP
]
(7.14)
≤ Tr
[
2−κρ1+γ + (1− 2−κ)ρ1+γP
]
. (7.15)
By Proposition 6.3,
Tr[ρ1+γP ] + 2
−κTr[ρ1+γF ] ≤ Tr
{
2−κρ1+γ + (1− 2−κ)[ρ− (h/2)ρ− vρ1]1+γ
}
. (7.16)
Applying the rule Tr[(X − Y)1+γ] ≤ Tr[X1+γ] − Tr[Y1+γ], followed by the fact that Tr[ρ1+γ1 ] =
tTr[ρ1+γ], we have the following:
Tr[ρ1+γP ] + 2
−κTr[ρ1+γF ] ≤ Tr
{
2−κρ1+γ + (1− 2−κ)[ρ1+γ − (h/2)1+γρ1+γ − v1+γρ1+γ1 ]
}
= Tr
{
2−κρ1+γ + (1− 2−κ)[ρ1+γ − (h/2)1+γρ1+γ − v1+γtρ1+γ]
}
=
{
2−κ + (1− 2−κ)[1− (h/2)1+γ − v1+γt]
}
Tr[ρ1+γ] (7.17)
=
{
1− (1− 2−κ)[(h/2)1+γ + v1+γt]
}
Tr[ρ1+γ]. (7.18)
Combining (7.12), (7.13), and (7.18), we find the following: if we set
λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t) =
(
(1− q)2−γΠ(γ,t) + q
{
1− (1− 2−κ)[(h/2)1+γ + v1+γt]
})1/γ
,
then
d1+γ(ρ‖σ) ≤ λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t) · d1+γ(ρ‖I). (7.19)
Therefore setting Λ = − logλ yields (7.10).
It remains for us to evaluate the limiting behavior of Λ as (q, κ, t) → (0, 0, t0). We can rewrite
the formula for λ as
λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t) =
(
1+
{
(1− q)(2−γΠ(γ,t)− 1) + q(2−κ − 1)[(h/2)1+γ + v1+γt]
})1/γ
Applying Proposition A.7 to this expression (with g = γ, and f equal to the function enclosed by
braces), we have
ln
[
lim
(q,κ,t)→(0,0,t0)
λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t)
]
= lim
(q,κ,t)→(0,0,t0)
{
(1− q)
(
2−γΠ(γ,t)− 1
γ
)
+
(
q(2−κ − 1)
γ
)
[(h/2)1+γ + v1+γt]
}
= (1)(− ln 2)π(t0) + (− ln 2)(r−1)[(h/2) + vt0],
which implies (7.11) as desired.
Proposition 7.1 is not sufficient for our ultimate proof of security because it assumes that ad-
ditional information (beyond the trust parameters v, h) is is known about the device D. The next
proposition avoids this limitation. (It makes no use of the failure parameters of the device.)
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Proposition 7.2. There is a continuous real-valued function ∆(v, h, q, κ, r) such that the following condi-
tions hold.
1. Let D be a partially trusted measurement device with parameters (v, h), and let E be a purtifying
system for D. Let γ = rqκ, and let
σ = (1− q)I ⊕ (1− q)I ⊕ qI ⊕ q2κ/γI. (7.20)
Then,
d1+γ(ρ‖σ) ≤ 2−∆(v,h,q,κ,r) · d1+γ(ρ‖I). (7.21)
2. The following limit condition is satisfied:
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
∆(v, h, q, κ, r) = min
s∈[0,1]
(
π(s) +
h/2+ vs
r
)
, (7.22)
where π is the function from Theorem 4.2.
Proof. Let Λ be the function from Proposition 7.1, and let
∆(v, h, q, κ, r) = min
t∈[0,1]
Λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t). (7.23)
Clearly, (7.21) holds by Proposition 7.1. Equality (7.22) follows via Proposition A.8.
7.3 Multi-Shot Results
The goal of this subsection is to deduce consequences of Proposition 7.2 across multiple iterations.
Let ΓEGO denote the joint state of the registers E, G, and O. (Note that Γ is a classical-quantum
state with respect to the partition (GO|E).)
The following proposition follows immediately from Proposition 7.2 by induction.
Proposition 7.3. Let D be a partially trusted measurement device with parameters (v,w), and let E be a
purifying system for D. Let γ = rqκ, and let Φ be the operator on E⊗ G⊗O given by
Φ = IE ⊗

 ∑
g,o∈{0,1}N
(1− q)∑i(1−gi)q∑i gi2(∑i gioi)/(qr) |go〉 〈go|

 . (7.24)
Then,
D1+γ (ΓEGO‖Φ) ≤ D1+γ (ΓE‖I)− N · ∆(v, h, q, κ, r), (7.25)
where ∆ denotes the function from Proposition 7.2.
We note the significance of the exponents in (7.24): the quantity ∑Ni=1(1− gi) is the number of
generation rounds that occured in Protocol A’, the quantity ∑Ni=1 gi is the number of game rounds,
and the quantity ∑Ni=1 gioi is the number of times the “failure” event occurred during the protocol.
As stated, Proposition 7.3 is not useful for bounding the randomness of ΓEGO because the
quantity D1+γ(ΓE‖I) could be arbitrarily large. We therefore prove the following alternate version
of the proposition. The statement is the same, except that we replace IE in (7.24) with ΓE, and we
remove the term D1+γ(ΓE‖I) from (7.25).
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Proposition 7.4. Let D be a partially trusted measurement device with parameters (v,w), and let E be a
purifying system for D. Let γ = rqκ, and let Σ be the operator on E⊗ G⊗O given by
Σ = ΓE ⊗

 ∑
g,o∈{0,1}N
(1− q)∑i(1−gi)q∑i gi2(∑i gioi)/(qr) |go〉 〈go|

 . (7.26)
Then,
D1+γ (ΓEGO‖Σ) ≤ −N · ∆(v, h, q, κ, r), (7.27)
where ∆ denotes the function from Proposition 7.2.
Proof. Let Γ = ΓE. Let (D, E
′) be the device-environment pair that arises from taking the pair
(D, E) and applying the stochastic operation
X 7→ Γ −γ2+2γXΓ −γ2+2γ (7.28)
to the system E. The state ΓE′ of the resulting system E
′ satisfies
ΓE′ =
Γ1/(1+γ)
K
, (7.29)
where K = Tr(Γ1/(1+γ)).
By directly applying the definition ofDα (seeDefinition 3.2) we can see that certain divergences
of ΓEGO and ΓE′GO can be computed from one another:
D1+γ(ΓE′GO‖Φ) = −1+ γ
γ
· logK + D1+γ(ΓEGO‖Σ) (7.30)
D1+γ(ΓE′‖I) = −1+ γ
γ
· logK + D1+γ(ΓE‖Γ). (7.31)
Applying Proposition 7.3 to (D, E′), we find that
D1+γ(ΓE′GO‖Φ)− D1+γ(ΓE′‖I) ≤ −N∆(v, h, q, κ, r). (7.32)
By (7.30)–(7.31), the same bound holds when E′,Φ, I are replaced E,Σ, Γ. Since D1+γ(ΓE‖Γ) = 0,
the desired inequality is obtained.
The following corollary of Proposition 7.4 provides final preparation for the proof of the main
result.
Corollary 7.5. Let ǫ > 0. Then, there exists a positive semidefinite operator ΓEGO which is classical with
respect to the systems E and G such that∥∥ΓEGO − ΓEGO∥∥1 ≤ ǫ (7.33)
and
Dmax(ΓEGO‖Σ) ≤ −N · ∆(v, h, q, κ, r) + log(2/ǫ
2)
qκr
(7.34)
(where ∆ and Σ are as in Proposition 7.2 and Proposition 7.4, respectively).
Proof. This follows from Proposition 3.5.
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7.4 The Security of Protocol A’
Let s denote the event that Protocol A’ succeeds, and let ΓsEGO denote the corresponding (subnor-
malized) operator on E⊗ G⊗O.
Proposition 7.6. There exists a continuous real-valued function R(v, h, η, q, κ, r) such that the following
holds.
1. Let ǫ > 0. If Protocol A’ is executed with parameters (v, h,N, q, η,D), then
Hǫmin(Γ
s
EGO | EG) ≥ N · R(v, h, η, q, κ, r) −
log(2/ǫ2)
qκr
. (7.35)
2. The following equality holds:
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
R(v, h, η, q, κ, r) = min
s∈[0,1]
[
π(s) +
vs− η
r
]
(7.36)
Proof. The “success” event for Protocol A’ is defined by the inequality
∑
i
gioi ≤ (h/2+ η)qN. (7.37)
Let S ⊆ G ⊗ O be the span of the vectors |go〉 where (g, o) varies over all pairs of sequences
satisfying (7.37). For any operator X on E ⊗ G ⊗ O which is classical-quantum with respect to
(GO|E), let Xs denote the restriction of X to E ⊗ S. Applying this construction to the operators
ΓEGO, ΓEGO and Σ from Corollary 7.5, and using the fact that Dmax and ‖·‖1 are monotonically
decreasing under restriction to S, we find that
Dǫmax(Γ
s
EGO‖Σs) ≤ −N · ∆(v, h, q, κ, r) +
log(2/ǫ2)
qκr
. (7.38)
In order to give a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy of ΓsEGO, we need to compute its
divergence with respect to an operator on E ⊗ G ⊗ O that is of the form X ⊗ IO, where X is a
density matrix. Define a new operator Σ′ on E⊗ G⊗O by
Σ′ = ΓE ⊗
(
∑
(g,o)∈S
(1− q)∑i(1−gi)q∑i gi2(h/2+η)N/r |go〉 〈go|
)
(7.39)
(recalling that γ = qκr). Comparing this definition with (7.26) and using the success criterion
(7.37), we find that Σ′ ≥ Σs. Therefore, the bound in (7.38) holds also when Σs is replaced by Σ′.
When we let Ψ be the operator on E⊗ G defined by
Ψ = ΓE ⊗ ∑
g∈{0,1}N
(1− q)∑i(1−gi)q∑i gi |g〉 〈g| (7.40)
and rewrite Σ′ as
Σ′ = 2(h/2+η)N/r(Ψ⊗ IO), (7.41)
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we find (using the rule Dǫmax(X‖Y) = log c+ Dǫmax(X‖cY)) that
Dǫmax(Γ
s
EGO‖Ψ⊗ IO) ≤ (h/2+ η)N/r − N · ∆(v, h, q, κ, r)
+
log(2/ǫ2)
qκr
.
Since Ψ is a density matrix, we have
Hǫmin(Γ
s
EGO | EG) ≥ −Dǫmax(ΓsEGO‖Ψ⊗ IO). (7.42)
Therefore if we let
R(v, h, η, q, κ, r) = −h/2+ η
r
+ ∆(v, h, q, κ, r), (7.43)
condition 1 of the theorem is fulfilled. Condition 2 follows easily from the formula for the limit of
∆ (7.22).
A final improvement can be made on the previous result by optimizing the coefficient r.
Theorem 7.7. There exist continuous real-valued functions T(v, h, η, q, κ) and F(v, h, η, q, κ) such that
the following holds.
1. If Protocol A’ is executed with parameters (v, h,N, q, η,D), then for any ǫ ∈ (0,√2] and κ ∈ (0,∞),
Hǫmin(Γ
s
EGO | EG) ≥ N · T(v, h, η, q, κ) −
(
log(
√
2/ǫ)
qκ
)
F(v, h, η, q, κ). (7.44)
2. The following equalities hold, where π denotes the function from Theorem 4.2.
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
T(v, h, η, q, κ) = π(η/v), (7.45)
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
F(v, h, η, q, κ) =
−2π′(η/v)
v
. (7.46)
Proof. Let
r = min
{
v
−π′(η/v) ,
1
qκ
}
. (7.47)
Define the function T by
T(v, h, η, q, κ) = R(v, h, η, q, κ, r). (7.48)
By substitution into Proposition 7.6, the bound (7.44) will hold when we set F to be equal to 2/(r).
To prove (7.45), note that
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
T(v, h, η, q, κ) = lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
R
(
v, h, η, q, κ,
v
−π′(η/v)
)
(7.49)
= min
s∈[0,1]
[
π(s)− π
′(η/v)
v
(vs− η)
]
(7.50)
= min
s∈[0,1]
[
π(s)− π′(η/v)(s− η
v
)
]
. (7.51)
The function enclosed by square brackets in (7.51) is a convex function of s (by Theorem 4.2) and
its derivative at s = η/v is zero. Therefore, a minimum is achieved at s = η/v, and the expression
in (7.51) thus evaluates simply to π(η/v).
Equality (7.46) is immediate. This completes the proof.
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8 Randomness Expansion from an Untrusted Device
In this section, we will combine the results of previous sections to prove that randomness expan-
sion from an untrusted device is possible.
8.1 The Trust Coefficient of a Strong Self-Test
Corollary 6.5 proves that if G is a strong self-test, then for some δG > 0, the behavior of an un-
trusted device under G can be simulated by a partially trusted device with parameters (δG, 2fG).
Let us say that the trust coefficient of G is the largest value of δG which makes such a simulation
possible.
As a consequence of the theory in section 5, we have the following formal definition for the
trust coefficient of G.
Definition 8.1. Suppose that G is an n-player binary XOR game. Then the trust coefficient of G, denoted
vG, is the maximum value of c ≥ 0 such that there exists a Hermitian operator N on
(
C2
)⊗n
satisfying the
following conditions.
1. The square of N is the identity operator on
(
C2
)⊗n
.
2. The operator N anticommutes with the operator
[
0 1
1 0
]
⊗ I⊗ . . .⊗ I.
3. For any complex numbers ζ1, . . . , ζn ∈ {ζ | |ζ| = 1, Im(ζ) ≥ 0}, the operator given by
M =


a00...0
a00...1
. .
.
a11...0
a11...1

 , (8.1)
where
ab1 ,...,bn = PG(ζ
(−1)b1
1 , ζ
(−1)b2
2 , . . . , ζ
(−1)bn
n ), (8.2)
satisfies
‖M− cN‖ ≤ qG − c. (8.3)
8.2 The Security of Protocol R
Combining Theorem 7.7, Corollary 6.5, and the definition from the previous subsection, we have
the following. As with Protocol A’, let us record the outputs of Protocol R as bit sequences G =
(g1, . . . , gN) and O = (o1, . . . , oN), where oi = 0 if the outcome of the ith round is H or P, and
oi = 1 otherwise. If E is a purifying system for the device D used in Protocol R, then we denote by
ΓEGO the state of E, G, andO, and by Γ
s
EGO the subnormalized state corresponding to the “success”
event.
Theorem 8.2. There exists continuous real-valued functions T(v, h, η, q, κ) and F(v, h, η, q, κ) (with the
domains specified in Figure 5) such that the following statements hold.
42
1. Let G be an n-player strong self-test. Let D be an untrusted device with n components, and let E be
a purifying system for D. Suppose that Protocol R is executed with parameters N, η, q,G,D. Then,
for any κ ∈ (0,∞) and ǫ ∈ (0,√2], the following bound holds.
Hǫmin(Γ
s
EGO | EG) ≥ N · T(vG, 2fG, η, q, κ)−
(
log(
√
2/ǫ)
qκ
)
F(vG, 2fG, η, q, κ), (8.4)
2. The following limit conditions are satisfied, where π denotes the function from Theorem 4.2.
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
T(v, h, η, q, κ) = π(η/v), (8.5)
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
F(v, h, η, q, κ) =
−2π′(η/v)
v
. (8.6)
The following corollary shows that the linear rate of Protocol R can be lower bounded by the
function π from Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 8.3. Let G be a strong self-test, and let η > 0 and δ > 0 be real numbers. Then, there exists
positive reals b and q0 such that the following holds. If Protocol R is executed with parameters N, η, q,G,D,
where q ≤ q0, then
Hǫmin(Γ
s
EGO | EG) ≥ N · (π(η/vG)− δ), (8.7)
where ǫ =
√
2 · 2−bqN.
Proof. By the limit conditions for T and F, we can find q0, κ0 > 0 sufficiently small and M > 0
sufficiently large so that for any q ∈ (0, q0] and κ ∈ (0, κ0],
T(vG, 2fG, η, q, κ) ≥ π(η/vG)− δ/2 (8.8)
F(vG, 2fG, η, q, κ) ≤ M. (8.9)
Let b = δκ0/(2M), and let ǫ =
√
2 · 2−bqN. Then, provided that q ≤ q0, the output of Protocol R
satisfies
Hǫmin(Γ
s
EGO | EG) ≥ N · T(vG, 2fG, η, q, κ0)−
(
log(
√
2/ǫ)
qκ0
)
F(vG, 2fG , η, q, κ0)
≥ N(π(η/vG)− δ/2)−
(
bqN
qκ0
)
M (8.10)
= N(π(η/vG)− δ/2)− (δ/2)N, (8.11)
which simplifies to the desired bound.
We will prove some additional corollaries in order to achieve a security result at full strength.
First wish to show that the output register O has high min-entropy even when conditioned on
the original inputs to the device D. The above corollary takes into account the biased coin flips
g1, . . . , gN used in the protocol, but it does not take into account the inputs that are given to D
during game rounds.
For each k ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, let Ik denote a classical register consisting of n bits which records the
input used at the kth round. Let I be the collection of the all the registers I1, . . . , IN.
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Corollary 8.4. Let G be a strong self-test, and let η > 0 and δ > 0 be real numbers. Then, there exist posi-
tive reals b, K, and q0 such that the following holds. If Protocol R is executed with parameters N, η, q,G,D,
where q ≤ q0, then
Hǫmin(Γ
s
EGIO | EGI) ≥ N · (π(η/vG)− δ), (8.12)
where ǫ = K · 2−bqN.
Proof. Let δ′ = δ/2. By Corollary 8.4, we can find b′ and q0 such that whenever Protocol R is
executed with q ≤ q0,
Hǫ
′
min(Γ
s
EGO | EG) ≥ N · (π(η/vG)− δ/2), (8.13)
where ǫ′ =
√
2 · 2−b′qN . By decreasing q0 if necessary, we will assume that q0 < δ/(2n).
For each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ⌊Nδ/(2n)⌋}, let Ik denote the input string that was given to the device D
on the kth game round. If there were fewer than k game rounds, then simply let Ik be the sequence
00 . . . 0. Let I denote the collection of the registers I1, . . . , I⌊Nδ/(2n)⌋.
Let d denote the event that
∑Gi ≤ Nδ/(2n). (8.14)
(That is, d denotes the event that the number of game rounds is not more than Nδ/2.) By the
Azuma-Hoeffding inequality,
P(d) ≤ e−N[δ/(2n)−q0]2/2. (8.15)
Let ǫ be the sum of ǫ′ and the quantity on the right of (8.15), and let sd denote the intersection of
the event d and the success event s. Observe the following sequence of inequalities, where we first
use the fact that the operator ΓsdEGIO can be reconstructed from the operator Γ
sd
EGIO
, and then use
the fact that the register I consists of ≤ (Nδ/2) bits:
Hǫmin(Γ
s
EGIO | EGI) ≥ Hǫ
′
min(Γ
sd
EGIO | EGI) (8.16)
= Hǫ
′
min(Γ
sd
EGIO
| EGI), (8.17)
≥ Hǫ′min(ΓsdEGO | EG)− Nδ/2 (8.18)
≥ Hǫ′min(ΓsEGO | EG)− Nδ/2 (8.19)
≥ N · (π(η/vG)− δ). (8.20)
We wish to show that ǫ is upper bounded by a decaying exponential function of qN (i.e., a
function of the form J · 2−cqN, where J and c are positive constants depending only on δ, η, and
G). We already know that ǫ′ has such an upper bound. The expression on the right side of (8.15)
also has such a bound — indeed, it has a bound of the form J · 2−cN , which is stronger. Therefore
ǫ (which is the sum of the aforementioned quantities) is also bounded by a decaying exponential
function. This completes the proof.
Finally, we wish to state a result using the language of extractable bits from subsection 1.5.
Note that if ρXZ is a subnormalized classical quantum state of a system (X,Z) that is such that
Hǫmin(ρXZ | Z) ≥ C, (8.21)
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Then either Tr(ρ) ≤ 2ǫ, in which case ρ is within trace distance 2ǫ of the zero state (which has an
infinite number of extractable bits) or Tr(ρ) > 2ǫ, in which case ρ is within ǫ of a nonzero state ρ′
satisfying Hmin(ρ
′ | Z) ≥ C. In the latter case, since Tr(ρ′) ≥ Tr(ρ)− ǫ > ǫ, we must have
Hǫmin(ρ
′/Tr(ρ′) | Z) ≥ C− log(1/ǫ). (8.22)
Thus ρXZ is within trace-distance 2ǫ of a state that has C− log(1/ǫ) extractable bits.
The next collary follows easily.
Corollary 8.5. Let G be a strong self-test, and let η, δ > 0 be real numbers. Then, there exist positive
reals b,K and q0 such that the following holds. If Protocol R is executed with parameters N, η, q,G,D with
q ≤ q0, then it produces
N · (π(η/vG)− δ) (8.23)
extractable bits with soundness error K · 2−bqN.
Remark 8.6. Corollary 8.4 implies that if π(η/vG) > 0, then (provided q is sufficiently small) a positive
linear rate of output entropy is achieved by Protocol R. Using Theorem 4.2, this means that a positive linear
rate is achieved if η < 0.11 · vG.
Recall that π(0) = 1. The next corollary follows easily from Corollary 8.4.
Corollary 8.7. Let G be a strong self-test, and let δ > 0 be a real number. Then, there exist positive reals
b,K, η and q0 such that the following holds. If Protocol R is executed with parameters N, η, q,G,D with
q ≤ q0, then it produces N · (1− δ) extractable bits with soundness error K · 2−bqN.
8.3 Example: The GHZ game
Let H denote the 3-player binary XOR game whose polynomial PH is given by
PH(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) =
1
4
(1− ζ1ζ2 − ζ2ζ3 − ζ1ζ3) . (8.24)
This is the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) game.
Proposition 8.8. The trust coefficient for the GHZ game H is at least 0.14.
For the proof of this result we will need the following lemma (which the current authors also
used in [Miller and Shi, 2013]):
Lemma 8.9. Let a, b, c be unit-length complex numbers such that Im(a) ≥ 0 and Im(b), Im(c) ≤ 0.
Then,
|1− ab− bc− ca| ≤
√
2
2
. (8.25)
Proof. We have
− 1+ ab+ bc+ ca = (−1+ bc) + a(b+ c). (8.26)
The complex number (b+ c) lies at an angle of π/2 (in the counterclockwise direction) from (−1+
bc). Since a has nonnegative imaginary part, the angle formed by a(b+ c) and (−1+ bc) must be
an obtuse or a right angle. Therefore,
|(−1+ bc) + a(b+ c)|2 ≤ |−1+ bc|2 + |a(b+ c)|2 (8.27)
≤ 4+ 4 (8.28)
= 8. (8.29)
The desired result follows.
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of Proposition 8.8. We proceed from Definition 8.1. Let N be the reverse-diagonal matrix
N =


1
1
−1
−1
−1
−1
1
1


. (8.30)
Clearly, N anticommutes with σx ⊗ I ⊗ . . .⊗ I.
Let ζ1, ζ2, ζ3 be unit-length complex numbers with nonnegative imaginary part, and let M be
the operator given by (8.1)–(8.2). We wish to show that the operator norm of M − (0.14)N is
bounded by qH − 0.14 = 0.86.
Note that ∣∣∣∣14 (1− ζ1ζ2 − ζ2ζ3 − ζ1ζ3)− 0.14
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣0.11− 14 (ζ1ζ2 + ζ2ζ3 + ζ1ζ3)
∣∣∣∣ (8.31)
≤ 0.11+ 0.75 (8.32)
= 0.86. (8.33)
Also, by applying Lemma 8.9,∣∣∣∣14 (1− ζ1ζ2 − ζ2ζ3 − ζ1ζ3)+ 0.14
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣14 (1− ζ1ζ2 − ζ2ζ3 − ζ1ζ3)
∣∣∣∣+ 0.14 (8.34)
≤
√
2
2
+ 0.14 (8.35)
≤ 0.86. (8.36)
Applying similar arguments shows that every reverse-diagonal entry of (M− 0.14 · N) has abso-
lute value bounded by 0.86. This completes the proof.
Remark 8.10. By the above result and Remark 8.6, we have the following. If η is a positive real smaller
than 0.0154 (= 0.11 · 0.14) and if q > 0 is sufficiently small, then executing Protocol R with the GHZ
game yields a positive linear rate of entropy.
8.4 Completeness
Let D be an n-component binary quantum device. For any j ≥ 1, we will use the expressions Ij
and Yj to denote the input strings and output strings (each in {0, 1}n) for D from the jth iteration.
Definition 8.11. Let G be a strong self-test. For each input string i = (i1, . . . , in) ∈ {0, 1}n , the unique
optimal strategy for G (see section 5) determines a distribution on output strings y ∈ {0, 1}n which we
denote by {pyi | y ∈ {0, 1}n}. We will say that D has noise level β (for the game G) if, for any k ≥ 1, and
i1, . . . , ik, y1, . . . , yk−1 ∈ {0, 1}n such that
P((Y1, . . . ,Yk−1) = (y1, . . . , yk−1) | (I1, . . . , Ik−1) = (i1, . . . , ik−1)) > 0, (8.37)
the conditional distribution
{P((Y1, . . . ,Yk−1) = (y1, . . . , yk) ∧Yk = y | (I1, . . . , Ik) = (i1, . . . , ik))}y (8.38)
is within statistical distance (2β) from {pyik}y.
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Note that an easy argument shows that a device with noise level β must achieve an expected
score of at least wG − β.
We now discuss completeness. We will make use of a refined Azuma-Hoeffding inequal-
ity [Dembo and Zeitouni, 1997].
Lemma 8.12. Suppose that S1, S2, ..., SN is a Martingale with
|Si+1 − Si| ≤ 1,
and
Var [Si+1− Si | S1, ..., Si] ≤ w,
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Then for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
P [SN ≥ ǫwN] ≤ exp
(
−ǫ2w
2
N
(
1− 1− w
3
ǫ
))
. (8.39)
In particular if ǫ ≤ 1, we have
P [SN ≥ ǫwN] ≤ exp
(
−ǫ2w
3
N
)
. (8.40)
Proposition 8.13. Suppose that the device in Protocol R has noise level η′ < η. Then the probability of
aborting is at most exp(−(η − η′)2qN/3).
Proof. Let I1, . . . , IN and Y1, . . . ,YN be random variables containing the inputs and outputs for
Protocol R. Let Zi be equal to 1 if the game is won on the ith round and 0 otherwise. Let
zi = E[Zi | I1, . . . , Ii−1,Y1, . . . ,Yi−1]. (8.41)
By definition, Protocol R (Fig. 2) aborts when
∑
i
gi(1− Zi) ≥ (1−wG + η)qN. (8.42)
By assumption,
∑
i
(wG − zi) ≤ η′N. (8.43)
Let
Ri =
i
∑
k=1
gk(1− Zk)− q
i
∑
k=1
(1− zk). (8.44)
Then R1, R2, . . . is a Martingale with
Var [Ri − Ri−1 | R1, ..., Ri−1] = q(1− zi)[1− q(1− zi)] ≤ q, (8.45)
thus (8.42) implies that
∑
i
gi(1− Zi)− q∑
i
(1− zi) ≥ ηqN − q∑
i
(wG − zi) ≥ (η − η′)qN. (8.46)
Thus by Corollary 10.4, the probability of aborting is ≤ exp(−(η − η′)2qN/3).
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9 Unbounded Expansion
In this section, we prove a general result, the Composition Lemma (Lemma 9.3 below), that im-
plies Corollary 1.7 straightforwardly. This general result implies that known untrusted-device
randomness expansion protocols, including ours, can be composed sequentially with additive er-
rors, even if only two devices are used. The proof will be short, but it is important to define
the error parameters appropriately. We us a high-level framework for rigorously reasoning about
these protocols, following [Chung et al., 2014]. We only sketch the necessary elements and refer
interested readers to [Chung et al., 2014] for a more comprehensive description.
Since we are cross-feeding inputs and outputs between devices, we will use the same syntax
for both input and output states. A protocol state space H is a three-part Hilbert space
H = C⊗ D⊗ E, (9.1)
where C, D, E are referred to as the classical, device, and adversary subsystems, respectively.5 We
also represent a protocol space by the triple (C,D, E).
We call a subnormalized classical-quantum-quantum state ρ over H a protocol state. Those
states are the accepting (or non-aborting) portion of the normalized states in our protocols. De-
note by ρˆ = ρ/Tr(ρ) the corresponding normalized state. Correspondingly, we allow quantum
operations to be trace-non-increasing with the understanding that the missing trace (from the
unit) corresponds to rejecting (or aborting).
We call a protocol state ρCDE device-uniform, adversary-uniform, or global-uniform if in ρˆ,
C is uniform with respect to D, or E, or DE, respectively. For any ǫ ∈ [0, 2], ρ is said to be ǫ-
device-uniform if there exists a subnormalized device-uniform state ρ˜D within ǫ trace-distance to
ρ. Similarly define ǫ-adversary-uniform and ǫ-global-uniform.
A strong untrusted-device (UD) extractor Π is a procedure which takes as input a classical
register X, a device D, and a quantum system E, then performs X-controlled operations on D and
E, produces a classical output register Y, and then “aborts” or “succeeds.” For our discussion in
this paper, we allow the steps in the procedure to include both classical interactionwith the device,
and arbitrary device-adversary operations (i.e., quantumoperations on the composite systemDE).
The protocol Π maps protocol states over the input protocol space (X,D, E) to those over the
output protocol space (Y,D,XE) (the success states). An implementation of the extractor Π is a
specification of the initial state of (X,D, E), and the measurements performed by the device, and
the operations used in any device-adversary interactions.
If Π is a strong UD extractor which involves no device-adversary interactions, then an ideal
implementation for Π is one in which the device is such that it has the same conditional input-
output distribution on each use. If an ideal implementation has been specified, we then use the
term noise level in the same sense as in Definition 8.11: an implementation for Π has noise level η
if at each use, the output distribution of the device D on any transcript and any input is within sta-
tistical distance η from that of the ideal implementation. The extractor Π has completeness error
ǫc tolerating noise level η if for any implementation having noise level η, the success probability
of Π is at least 1− ǫc.
Let Π is a strong UD extractor which has no device-adversary interactions. We call ǫs a sound-
ness error of Π on a set S of protocol states if for any ρ ∈ S and any compatible implementation,
Π(ρ) is ǫs-adversary uniform. We say that on S , Π has a adjustment completeness error ǫˆc tol-
erating a noise level η, if there exists an ideal implementation, such that for all normalized states
5If D is a quantum device, then by a small abuse of notation, let us also use the letter D to denote the quantum
system inside D.
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1
0
D11
X2D
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1
D20
X3D
3
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D31
XTD
T
1−b
DTb
DT+11−b
DT+1b
Figure 6: The tensor network representation of a cross-feeding protocol. Superscripts indicate
that a (device or adversary) subsystem may change after an operation. Each Et includes a copy
of X0, ...,Xt−1 to be consistent with the definition of strong UD extractors. The subscript b = T
mod 2.
ρ ∈ S and all implementations with noise level η, the protocol’s final state is within ǫˆc trace dis-
tance to a normalized adversary-uniform state. This change of completeness error is not substantial:
ǫˆc ≤ 2(ǫc + ǫs), and ǫs ≤ ǫˆc.
The Equivalence Lemma of Chung, Shi and Wu [Chung et al., 2014] states the following.
Theorem 9.1 (The Equivalence Lemma [Chung et al., 2014]). Let Π be a strong UD extractor that has
no device-adversary interactions. Then on the set of global-uniform inputs and the set of device-uniform
inputs, Π has the same soundness error, adjustment completeness error, and noise tolerating level.
We now formally define the composition of protocols using two devices. (The earliest mention
of this approach that we know of was in [Pironio et al., 2010].)
Definition 9.2. Let D0 and D1 be two untrusted quantum devices and T ≥ 1 be an integer. A cross-
feeding protocol Σ using D0 and D1 consists of a sequence of strong UD extractors Σi, i = 0, 1, ..., T,
such that Σi uses Di mod 2 and the output of Σi is used as the input to Σi+1. The input to Σ is the input to
Σ0, and the output is that of ΣT.
Furthermore, Π is said to use restorable devices if, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T, between Σi−1 and Σi+1, there
is a device-adversary variable operation Ai on XiDi+1 mod 2E, controlled by Xi.
A cross-feeding protocol is illustrated in Fig. (6). Allowing the device-adversary Ai operations
reduces the technical challenges for practical implementations, since in an honest implementation,
Ai can be used to replenish the consumed entanglement. While our wording of “two” devices
was inspired by a possible implementation of using two physical devices, the inactive device
can certainly be replaced by a different physical device, since such replacement is one possible
Ai operation. The essence of our two device protocol lies in how communication is restricted:
besides forbidding communication between an active device and its external world — which is
already required for a single-device protocol — the additional constraint is that after an active
device finishes its work, no information is allowed to travel from the device to the inactive device
before the latter becomes active. A single device would not satisfy this latter requirement.
Lemma 9.3 (Composition Lemma). Let Σ be a cross-feeding protocol defined above. Assume that for
each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ T, Σi has a soundness error ǫs,i, and an adjustment completeness error ǫˆc,i tolerating a
noise level η (set to be the same for all Σi), with respect to device-uniform inputs. Let ǫs := ∑
T
i=0 ǫs,i and
ǫˆc := ∑
T
i=0 ǫˆc,i. Then Σ on states uniform to D0 has a soundness error ǫs, and an adjustment completeness
error ǫˆc tolerating an η level of noise.
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In particular, the above statement holds if each Σi has no device-adversary interaction and the parame-
ters ǫs, ǫˆc, η are valid on global-uniform inputs.
The soundness proof uses the following two facts, both of which follow directly from the cor-
responding definitions.
Fact 9.4. Let b ∈ {0, 1} and ρ = ρYDb(D1−bE) be adversary-uniform. Then ρ as ρYD1−b(DbE) is device-
uniform for D1−b. This remains true for (I ⊗ ADbE)ρ for any operation ADbE on DbE.
Fact 9.5. If Π is a strong UD extractor with an ǫ soundness error, and ρ is δ-device-uniform, Π(ρ) is
(ǫ+ δ)-adversary uniform.
Proof. The proof for the device-uniform case follows from a straightforward inductive proof on
the following two statements. Denote by ǫis := ∑
i
j=0 ǫs,j, and ǫˆ
i
c := ∑
i
j=0 ǫˆc,j.
• (Soundness) On any implementation and any initial input uniform to D0, for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤
T, the output of Σi is ǫ
i
s-adversary-uniform.
• (Completeness) Fix an ideal implementation for each Σi to achieve the adjustment complete-
ness error. For any η-deviated implementation, any normalized initial input uniform to D0,
any i, 0 ≤ i ≤ T, the output of Σi is ǫˆic-close to a normalized adversary-uniform state.
More specifically, for the soundness argument, the base case holds by applying Fact 9.5 to
Σ0 and the assumption that the input is uniform to D0. For the inductive step, by the inductive
hypothesis (assuming it holds for i, 0 ≤ i ≤ T − 1) and Fact 9.4, the input to Σi+1 is ǫis-device
uniform. By Fact 9.5, the output is thus ǫi+1s -adversary uniform. The proof for the completeness
follows from the definition of completeness and triangle inequality.
The global-uniform case follows by applying the Equivalence Lemma 9.1.
Corollary 1.7 follows by using our robust protocol in Corollary 1.4.
10 Untrusted-device Quantum Key Distribution
In this section, we shall first formally define what we mean by a key distribution protocol using
untrusted quantum devices. We then present Protocol Rkd, a natural adaptation of Protocol R for
untrusted-device quantum key distribution, then we prove its correctness (Corollary 1.9.)
10.1 Definitions
A min-entropy untrusted-device key distribution (ME-UD-KD) protocol Πkd is a communica-
tion protocol in the following form between two parties Alice and Bob who have access to distinct
components of an untrusted quantum device. Before the protocol starts, they share a string that
is uniformly random to the device. They communicate through a public, but authenticated, chan-
nel. At each step, both the message they send and the new input to their device components are a
deterministic function of the initial randomness, the messages received, and the previous output
of their device component. The protocol terminates with a public bit S, indicating if the protocol
succeeds or aborts, and Alice and Bob each have a private string: A and A˜, respectively.
The protocol is said to have a yield M with a soundness error ǫs if both the following condi-
tions hold.
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(a) the joint state (S, A, E) is ǫs-close to a mixture of an aborting state and one where A has M
extractable bits, and
(b) the joint state (S, A, A˜) is ǫs-close to a mixture of an aborting state and one where A = A˜.
The protocol is said to have a completeness error ǫc with respect to a non-empty class of un-
trusted devices Uhonest, if for any device in this class, the protocol aborts with probability ≤ ǫc.
If in the above definition, Condition (a) has “M extractable bits" replaced by “M uniformly
random bits”, then we call the protocol simply an untrusted-device key distribution protocol
with those parameters.
10.2 The Protocol Rkd
Protocol Rkd is an adaptation of Protocol R to the distributed setting and is described in Fig. 7.
There are two main steps in the proof for Corollary 1.9. The first is to show that for an appropriate
range of the parameters, Protocol R has a soundness and completeness error of exp(−Ω(qN))
with the ideal state being that A and B differ in at most a (1/2 − λ) fraction, for a constant λ.
The second step is to construct the Efficient Information Reconciliation Protocol that works on the
ideal state and for Bob to correct the differences with some small failure probability. We present
those two steps in two separate subsections, which are followed by the proof for the Corollary.
10.3 Error Rate
The completeness error is straightforward, so our focus will be on the soundness error.
Our result applies to a broader class of games than the strong self-tests.
Definition 10.1. Let f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a strictly increasing concave function with f (0) = 0. A game
G is said to be f -self-testing in probability if there exists an input x0 such that the following holds: If
for any θ ∈ (0, 1) and any quantum strategy that wins with probability (1− θ)wG, the game wins on x0
with probability ≥ (1− f (θ))wG.
Theorem 10.2. Let G be a strong self-test. Then there exists a constant C > 0 such that G is C
√
θ-self-
testing in probability.
Proof. Since G is strongly self-testing, there is a unique quantum strategy which achieves the opti-
mal winning probability wG (see section 5). Let x0 be an input string (which occurs with nonzero
probability in G) such that, if the optimal strategy is applied on input x0, the winning probability
is at least wG.
If a given quantum strategy for G achieves a score of (1− θ)wG, then by the strong self-testing
property its output distribution on input x0 is C1
√
θ-close to that of the optimal strategy, for some
constant C1. The result follows.
Consequently all strong self-tests are O(
√
θ)-self-testing in probability.
We now fix a game G that is f -self-testing in probability for some function f on input 00 . . . 0.
Let wi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, be the random variable denoting the chance of winning the ith round game
under the full input distribution, right after the (i− 1)th round is played. Similarly define w0i by
replacing the full input distribution with the input 00 . . . 0. These random variables may be corre-
lated as the behavior of the ith game may depend on the history of the previous i− 1 games. Let
Wi be a random variable which is equal to 1 if the game is won on the ith round, and 0 otherwise.
Note that the expected value of Wi is equal to wi if the ith round is a game round, and is equal
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D1 D2 Dn
Alice Bob
A diagram of Protocol Rkd.
Arguments:
G : An n-player nonlocal game that is a
strong self-test (Definition 5.6). Assume
without loss of generality that 0n is an in-
put on which the winning probability is
no less than the average in the optimal
quantum strategy.
D : An untrusted device (with n compo-
nents) that can play G repeatedly and
cannot receive any additional informa-
tion. Alice interacts with the first component while Bob interacts the rest of the device.
No communication is allowed among the components during Step 1-4 of the protocol. All
random bits chosen by Alice and Bob together are assumed to be perfectly random to D.
N : a positive integer (the output length.)
λ : A real ∈ (0,wG − 1/2). (1/2 − λ is the
key error fraction.)
η : A real ∈ (0, 12 ). (The error tolerance.)
q : A real ∈ (0, 1). (The test probability.)
Protocol:
1. Repeat the following procedure for N times. Alice and Bob will each produce a raw key,
stored as an N-bit binary string A and B, respectively.
(a) Alice and Bob choose a bit g ∈ {0, 1} according to a biased (1− q, q) distribution.
(b) If g = 1 (“game round”), then Alice and Bob choose an input string at random from
{0, 1}n according to the probability distribution specified by G. They give their part(s)
of D the corresponding input bit, exchange their output bits and record a “P” (pass) or
an “F” (fail) according to the rules of the game G, and store this bit (“P” as 1 and “F” as
0) as their raw key bit for this round.
(c) If g = 0 (“generation round”), then the input string 00 . . . 0 is given to the device. Alice
sets the raw key bit in A for this round to be her output bit. Bob sets his raw key bit in B
to be the unique bit that when XOR’edwith the output bit(s) of his device component(s)
would constitute a win for the game. That is, their bits are the same if and only if they
win the game.
2. If the total number of failures is more than (1−wG + η)qN, the protocol aborts.
3. If not yet aborted, they run an Efficient Information Reconciliation (such as Protocol EIR in
Fig. 8) on A and B, the parameters λ and ǫ = exp(−qN). Alice’s final output is A (un-
changed), and Bob’s final output A˜ is his output from the information reconciliation proto-
col.
Figure 7: Protocol Rkd
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to w0i if the ith round is a generation round. Another useful fact about Wi’s is that when gi = 0,
Wi = 1 if and only if the i’th bits of A and B are equal. This follows from the construction of B.
Consequently,
∑
i
Wi = N − |A+ B|. (10.1)
Intuitively, if the devices are doing well on the game rounds, they should do well on the ran-
domness generating rounds as well because of self-testing. The following theorem is one way to
express this intuition.
Lemma 10.3. Let G be a strong self-test game that is f -self-testing in probability for some f on input
00 . . . 0. Consider Protocol R (Fig. 2) using G and an arbitrary q ∈ (0, 1). For any λ ∈ (0,wG − 1/2)
and all sufficiently small constant η > 0, there exist constants α, β > 0 such that for the events
P := ∑
i
gi(1−Wi) ≤ (1−wG + η)qN, (10.2)
M := ∑
i
(1− gi)Wi ≤ (1/2+ λ)(1− q)N, and, (10.3)
E := P ∧M, (10.4)
we have
P[E] ≤ exp (−αqN) + exp (−βN) . (10.5)
To prove the above lemma, we first derive two concentration results. Consider
Ti :=
i
∑
j=1
(gi(1−Wi)− q(1−wi)) . (10.6)
Since E[gi(1−Wi)− q(1− wi) | T1, ..., Ti−1] = 0, and
Var [Ti − Ti−1 | T1, ..., Ti−1] = q(1− wi)[1− q(1− wi)] ≤ q, (10.7)
applying Lemma 8.12, we have
Corollary 10.4. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
P
[
∑
i
gi(1−Wi)− q∑
i
(1− wi) ≤ −ǫqN
]
≤ exp
(
−ǫ2 q
3
N
)
. (10.8)
Consider now
Si :=
i
∑
j=1
(
(1− gi)Wi − (1− q)w0i
)
. (10.9)
Then Si is a Martingale and
Var [Si − Si−1 | S1, ..., Si−1] = (1− q)w0i [1− (1− q)w0i ] ≤ 1− q. (10.10)
Thus the following Corollary follows from the standard Azuma-Hoeffding bound.
Corollary 10.5. For any ǫ > 0,
P
[
∑
i
(
(1− g0)Wi − (1− q)w0i
) ≤ −ǫ(1− q)N
]
≤ exp
(
−ǫ
2
3
(1− q)N
)
. (10.11)
53
of Lemma 10.3. Fix an arbitrary λ ∈ (0,wG − 1/2). Let η0 = η0(λ), ǫ1, ǫ2 ∈ (0, 1) be determined
later. Fix an arbitrary η ∈ (0, η0). Define the following two events
E1 := ∑
i
gi(1−Wi) > q∑
i
(1−wi)− ǫ1qN, (10.12)
E2 := ∑
i
(1− gi)Wi > (1− q)∑
i
w0i − ǫ2(1− q)N. (10.13)
Apply Corollaries (10.4) and (10.5) with ǫ = ǫ1 and ǫ = ǫ2, respectively, we have
P[E¯1] ≤ exp
(
−ǫ
2
1
3
qN
)
, (10.14)
P[E¯2] ≤ exp
(
−ǫ
2
2
3
(1− q)N
)
. (10.15)
Then
P[E] ≤ P[E¯1] + P[E¯2] + P[E ∧ E1 ∧ E2] (10.16)
≤ exp
(
−ǫ
2
1
3
qN
)
+ exp
(
−ǫ
2
2
3
(1− q)N
)
+ P[E ∧ E1 ∧ E2], (10.17)
where the bounds from (10.14, 10.15) are used.
To bound P[E ∧ E1 ∧ E2], denote by
wˆ :=
1
N ∑
i
wi/wG, and, wˆ
0 :=
1
N ∑
i
w0i /wG. (10.18)
Event P and E1 imply
1− wˆ < (η + ǫ1)/wG = η0/wG. (10.19)
By the assumption that G is f -self-testing in probability and the concavity of f , the above implies
1− wˆ0 < f (η0/wG) . (10.20)
Meanwhile, Event M and E2 imply
1− wˆ0 > 1− 1/2+ λ+ ǫ2
wG
. (10.21)
The last two inequalities imply
f ((η + ǫ1)/wG) > 1− (1/2+ λ+ ǫ2)/wG. (10.22)
Since f (θ) → 0 when θ → 0+, the LHS of the above inequality→ 0 when η + ǫ1 → 0. Note that
for any fixed λ < wG − 1/2, RHS > 0 when ǫ2 → 0+. Following this intuition, we define
η0 := max {t ∈ [0,wG] : f (t/wG) ≤ 1− (1/2+ λ)/wG} . (10.23)
Now if one sets ǫ1 = η0 − η − ǫ′ and let ǫ′, ǫ2 → 0+,
lim
ǫ′→0+
f ((η + ǫ1)/wG) = f (η0/wG) ≤ 1− (1/2+ λ)/wG = lim
ǫ2→0+
1− (1/2+ λ+ ǫ2)/wG.
Thus for some sufficiently small ǫ′0 > 0 and ǫ2 > 0, Eqn. 10.22 becomes false, which means that
Event E ∧ E1 ∧ E2 does not occur. Setting
α := (η0 − η − ǫ′0)2/3 and β := ǫ2, (10.24)
and by Eqn. (10.17),
P[E] ≤ exp (−αqN) + exp (−βN) . (10.25)
Thus the theorem holds.
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10.4 Efficient Information Reconciliation
We now arrive at the problem of resolving differences between Alice and Bob’s keys. This prob-
lem, called information reconciliation (IR), has been studied since the early days of quantum cryp-
tography (the earliest works include [Robert, 1985, Bennett et al., 1988]). There are several varia-
tions of the problem, for examples, depending on how the differences are quantified and if com-
putationally efficient solutions are sought. The content of this subsection is a synthesis of known
results; as such we do not claim any credit of originality. We choose to include it here because of
our goals may be different from other sources. Also, efficient constructions of a component (list-
decodable codes) known to be useful for IR long ago only became known more recently. The IR
protocol presented here follows a well-known framework (e.g., as described in [Smith, 2007]), but
will use the latest tools, some known after [Smith, 2007]. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, no
other sources have put these known facts together.
We summarize our goals for IR. First, we would like to succeed whenever the differences (re-
ferred to as errors) are bounded away from the above by 1/2-fraction. We hope that the solution is
efficient, not just in term of computational complexity, but also, most critically, the bits communi-
cated, as well as the number of shared random bits used. This is because any bit communicated in
this stagewill be subtracted from themin-entropy guarantee, and that our goal is to achieve secure
quantum key distribution with a short seed. We note that in the literature, the issue of computa-
tional efficiency and the amount of share randomness were often not considered, or were consid-
ered under a different set of assumptions (e.g., [Renner, 2005, Tomamichel and Leverrier, 2015]).
We define a quantity to describe the limit of surviving fraction of min-entropy.
Definition 10.6 (Efficient Information Reconciliation). Let λ ∈ (0, 1/2), ǫ ∈ (0, 1), N, R and M
be integers, and T be a function on N, λ and ǫ. An information reconciliation protocol with those
parameters is a communication protocol between two parties Alice and Bob with the following property. On
any N-bit strings A and B, known to Alice and Bob, respectively, they start the protocol with a shared R-bit
string, communicate M bits, and finally Bob outputs an N-bit string A˜. If A = A˜, the protocol succeeds;
otherwise it fails. For all A and B of Hamming distance |A⊕ B| ≤ (1/2− λ)N, the probability of failure
is
P[A 6= A˜] ≤ ǫ. (10.26)
The computation complexity of the protocol is ≤ T.
The protocol is said to be efficient if for a constant λ, R = O(log(N/ǫ)), M ≤ (1 − c)N +
O(log(1/ǫ)) for some constant c = c(λ), and T = poly(N, log(1/ǫ)).
The key ingredient in the protocol is to use binary linear error-correcting codes. When the
relative error is < 1/4, one can use a uniquely decodable code, as shown by [Bennett et al., 1991].
Otherwise, there is no binary code with a constant rate, by the Plotkin bound. Thus we will have
to resort to list-decodable binary linear codes. A folklore approach for pinning down the actual
error from the decoded list is to use hashing. Here we use approximate universal hashing. Explicit
constructions of all these three tools are known and are summarized below.
Theorem 10.7 (Corollary of Theorem 5 in [Guruswami and Indyk, 2005]). For any λ ∈ (0, 1/4),
there exists a family of binary linear codes with a relative error 1/4 − λ, a rate Ω(λ3), and linear time
complexity for encoding and decoding.
Theorem 10.8 ([Guruswami and Rudra, 2008] (Theorem 5.3 and Remark 5.2)). For any λ ∈ (0, 1/2),
and for an infinite number of integers N > 0, there exists a binary linear code of block length N, relative er-
ror 1/2−λ, rate Ω(λ3), that can be list-decoded into a list of size NO˜(log 1/λ3) with O(NO(1/λ4))) encoding
and decoding time.
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Definition 10.9 (Approximate Universal Hash Functions). A set H of functions h : U → V is a
ǫ-Universal Hash Function (-UHF) family if for all u, u′ ∈ U, u 6= u′,
Ph∈H[h(u) = h(u′)] ≤ ǫ. (10.27)
It is well known that good approximate UHF exists. A standard construction is the following
(see, e.g., [Boneh and Shoup, 2015]). Let Fp be a finite field of size q, U = Fℓq, H = V = Fp, where
each k ∈ H is identified with the function hk
hk : (aℓ−1, aℓ−2, · · · , a0) 7→ kℓ + aℓ−1kℓ−1 + · · ·+ a1k+ a0. (10.28)
Clearly if (a′
ℓ−1, a
′
ℓ−2, · · · , a′0) 6= (aℓ−1, aℓ−2, · · · , a0),
Pk∈H[hk(a′ℓ−1, a
′
ℓ−2, · · · , a′0) = hk(aℓ−1, aℓ−2, · · · , a0)] ≤ ℓ/p. (10.29)
Thus H is an ℓ/p-UHF with |U| = pℓ, |V| = |H| = p.
We will use an approximate UHF of the following parameters.
Proposition 10.10. For all sufficiently large integer N and any ǫ ≥ 142−N , there exists an explicit ǫ-UHF
from {0, 1}N → {0, 1}n of size 2n, where n = ⌈log (Nǫ / log Nǫ )⌉+ 2.
Proof. In the construction described above, use the finite field of size 2n and set ℓ = ⌊ǫ2n⌋. We
need only to check that n, ℓ ≥ 1 and nℓ ≥ N, which is indeed the case.
We are ready to present our protocol for Efficient Information Reconciliation and prove its
correctness.
One may note that in the final step of Protocol EIR, Bob could alternatively abort when there
is no unique ∆i such that h(Y + ∆i) = h(X). For technical convenience, our definition of Efficient
Information Reconciliation does not allow abort. But it can be easily modified to allow aborting,
and resulting performance parameters will be similar.
Proposition 10.11. The Protocol EIR in Fig. 8 is an Efficient Information Reconciliation protocol (Defini-
tion 10.6). If λ > 1/4 and a uniquely decodable code C is used, no randomness is needed and the protocol
succeeds with certainty.
Proof. The length of Alice’s message, the correctness of Bob’s output, and the computational com-
plexities follow from the properties of the error-correcting code (Theorems 10.7 and 10.8). For the
case of λ ≤ 1/4, the length of the shared randomness follows from the property of H. To ana-
lyze the failure probability, first observe that under the assumption that |X + Y| ≤ (1/2− λ)N,
X + Y = Di for some i. Thus the chance of failure is precisely the existence of i
′ 6= i such that
h(Y + Di) = h(Y + Di′). This probability is no more than Lǫ
′ = ǫ, as desired.
We remark that for an Efficient Information Reconciliation protocol, there may be a tradeoff
between the communication cost and the randomness used. For example, when the error rate
1/2−λ < 1/4, using a uniquely decodable code from Theorem 10.7 avoids the use of randomness
but c(λ) = O((λ− 1/4)3). If one uses the list-decodable code from Theorem 10.8, the rate may be
higher at the cost of some randomness.
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Arguments:
λ : A real constant ∈ (0, 1/2].
X,Y : Binary strings of length N such that |X ⊕ Y| ≤ (1/2− λ)N.
ǫ : A failure probability. Can be 0 if λ ∈ (1/4, 1/2].
A : The check matrix of an explicitly constructible (i.e. encoding and decoding in
polynomial time) binary linear error-correcting code C of length N, relative er-
ror 1/2 − λ, and a linear rate R = R(λ). The code C is uniquely decodable if
ǫ = 0. Such code exists (e.g., [Alon et al., 1992], [Guruswami and Indyk, 2005])
with R(λ) = Ω((λ − 1/4)3)). If C is list-decodable code, the list size
L = L(N,λ) = NO(1). Such a code exists (e.g, with R(λ) = Ω(λ3) as
in [Guruswami and Rudra, 2006]).
H : If C is list-decodable, let ǫ′ := ǫ/L. H is an explicit ǫ′-UHF from {0, 1}N to {0, 1}k
of size 2k, where k =
⌈
log
(
N
ǫ′ / log
N
ǫ′
)⌉
+ 2 = log(1/ǫ) +O(logN). SuchH exists
according to Proposition 10.10.
Protocol:
1. Alice sends Bob AX ∈ {0, 1}(1−R)N .
2. If C is uniquely decodable, Bob computes the error syndrome AY+ AX = A(X+
Y), runs the decoding algorithm to obtain the unique D with |D| ≤ (1/2− λ)N
and AD = A(X+Y). The protocol terminates with Bob outputting Y+ D.
3. Otherwise (C is list-decodable with list size L), Bob list-decodes from A(X + Y)
to obtain a list {∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆L}, where by the property of C, X + Y = ∆i, for
some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ L.
4. Alice and Bob draw a random h ∈ H, and Alice sends Bob h(X). Bob checks if
there exists a unique ∆i such that h(Y + ∆i) = h(X). If yes, Bob outputs Y + ∆i;
otherwise he outputs Y.
Figure 8: Protocol EIR: an Efficient Information Reconciliation protocol
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10.5 The Security of Protocol Rkd
We are now ready to prove our main result for untrusted-device QKD.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1.9. We set rG to be the supremum of reals R such that for some λ <
wG − 1/2, there exists an infinite family of explicit list-decodable6 binary linear codes of rate R
and relative error 1/2− λ. By using the list-decodable code from Theorem 10.8, rG = Ω((wG −
1/2)3) > 0.
We will show that any r < rG can be achieved. The proof for completeness is a standard
application of concentration inequalities thus we leave the proof for the interested reader. We
shall focus on proving the soundness.
Let δ = rG − r. Let λ ∈ (0,wG − 1/2) be such that there exists an Efficient Information Rec-
onciliation protocol PEIR with c(λ) ≥ rG − δ/3. Such λ and PEIR exist by the definition of rG and
Proposition 10.11.
Applying Theorem 1.1 with the δ parameter there set to be δ/3, we get the constants K, b, q0
and η0. Let η ≤ η0 and q ≤ q0 so that Theorem 1.1 applies. Further assume that η is small enough
so that Lemma 10.3 also applies.
To prove Condition (a) of the soundness definition (subsection 10.1), note that by Theorems 1.1,
the SAE-state (where S is the aborting decision bit, and E is the adversary’s system) before infor-
mation reconciliation has (1− δ/3)N extractable bits with soundness error ǫ′s := K exp(−bqN).
By definition, PEIR communicates ≤ (1 − c(λ))N + O(log 1/ǫ) bits. Thus the yield in A after
information reconciliation is at least
[(1− δ/3)− (1− c(λ))] · N −O(log 1/ǫ) (10.30)
= [c(λ)− δ/3] · N −O(qN) (10.31)
≥(rG − 2δ/3−O(q))N. (10.32)
If necessary, we lower the upper-bound for q so that in the above,O(q) ≤ δ/3. Thus the yield in A
is at least (rG − δ)N = rN. Since PEIR does not abort or change AE, the final state when restricted
to SAE remains unchanged, thus is ǫ′s-close to a mixture of an aborting state and a state where A
has rN extractable bits.
To satisfy soundness condition (b) (see subsection 10.1), we now bound the probability of the
event E 6= that the protocol does not abort and Alice and Bob’s keys (A and A˜) disagree. That is,
with P being the passing event (10.2),
E 6= :=
(
P ∧ (A 6= A˜)) . (10.33)
Recall that A and B are the raw keys before PEIR. Denote by ∆ the event that |A + B| <
(1/2 − λ)N. Let CG be the event that the number of game rounds is ≤ (1/2 + λ)qN. By the
Chernoff bound, with γ := (1/2−λ)
2
2 ,
P[CG] ≤ exp(−γqN). (10.34)
Let events P, M, E be defined as in Lemma 10.3, which we now apply with the above λ. Note
that (M¯ ∧ C¯G) implies ∆, because by construction, the raw key bits for game rounds always agree.
6We require that the size of the list is polynomial in the block length.
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We now upper-bound P[E 6=].
P[E 6=] ≤ P[E] + P[CG] + P[E 6= ∧ E¯ ∧ C¯G] (10.35)
= P[E] + P[CG] + P[P ∧ (A 6= A˜) ∧ C¯G ∧ M¯] (10.36)
≤ P[E] + P[CG] + P[(A 6= A˜) ∧ ∆] (10.37)
≤ P[E] + P[CG] + P[(A 6= A˜)|∆]. (10.38)
Applying Lemma 10.3, equation (10.34), and definition of Efficient Information Reconciliation,
the above is upper-bounded by
exp(−αqN) + exp(−βN) + exp(−γqN) + exp(−qN). (10.39)
Thus setting b′ := min{b, α, β,γ, 1} and K′ = max{K, 5}, we have that the soundness error is
K′ exp(−b′qN) = exp(−Ω(qN) +O(1)), (10.40)
thus proving the soundness result.
The number of random bits used in the expansion protocol is O(Nh(q)), and the number used
in PEIR is O(logN/ǫ), where ǫ = exp(−qN). This gives a total ofO(Nh(q) + logN+ qN) random
bits, which is O(Nh(q) + logN) (or simply O(Nh(q)) when qN = Ω(1)).
We leave the claims on the instantiation to the reader.
11 Further Directions
A natural goal at this point is to improve the certified rate of Protocol R. This is important for the
practical realization of our protocols. By the discussion in section 8, this reduces to two simple
questions. First, what techniques are there for computing the trust coefficient vG of a binary XOR
game? Second, is it possible to reprove Theorem 4.2 in such a way that the limiting function π(x)
becomes larger? A related question is to improve the key rate of Protocol Rkd. The “hybrid”
technique of Vazirani and Vidick [Vazirani and Vidick, 2014] for mixing the CHSH game with a
trivial game with unit quantum winning strategy may extend to general binary XOR games.
It would also be interesting to explore whether Theorem 1.1 could be extended to nonlocal
games outside the class of strong self-tests. Such an extension will not only facilitate the realiza-
tion of those protocols, but also will further identify the essential feature of quantum information
enabling those protocols. As the characterization of strong self-tests is critical for our proof, devel-
oping a theory of robust self-testing beyond binary XOR games may be useful for our question. It
is also conceivable that there exist fairly broad conditions under which a classical security proof,
which is typically much easier to establish, automatically imply quantum security. We consider
identifying such a wholesale security lifting principle as a major open problem.
A different direction to extend our result is to prove security based on physical principles
more general than quantum mechanics, such as non-signaling principle, or information causal-
ity [Pawłowski et al., 2009].
Our protocols require some initial perfect randomness to start with. The Chung-Shi-Wu proto-
col [Chung et al., 2014] relaxes this requirement to an arbitrary min-entropy source and tolerates
a universal constant level of noise. However, those were achieved at a great cost on the num-
ber of non-communicating devices. Another major open problem is whether our protocol can be
modified to handle non-uniform input.
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Randomness expansion can be thought of as a “seeded” extractions of randomness from un-
trusted quantum devices, in the sense of Chung, Shi, and Wu [Chung et al., 2014]. Our one-shot
and unbounded expansion results demonstrate a tradeoff between the seed length and the output
length different from that in classical extractors. Recall that a classical extractor with output length
N and error parameter ǫ requires Ω(logN/ǫ) seed length, while our unbounded expansion pro-
tocol can have a fixed seed length (which determines the error parameter). What is the maximum
amount of randomness one can extract from a device of a given amount of entanglement (i.e. is
the exponential rate optimal for one device)? What can one say about the tradeoff between expan-
sion rate and some proper quantity describing the communication restrictions? Answers to those
questions will reveal fundamental features of untrusted quantum devices as a source for random-
ness extraction, and will hopefully lead to an intuitive understanding of where the randomness
comes from.
Yet another important direction forward is to prove security in more complicated composi-
tion scenarios than the cross-feeding protocol. As pointed out by [Barrett et al., 2013], a device
reused may store previous runs’ information thus potentially may cause security problem in se-
quentially composed QKD protocols. While such “memory attack” appears not to be a problem
for sequential compositions of our randomness expansion protocol, it may for other more com-
plicated compositions. Thus it is desirable to design untrusted-device protocols and prove their
security under broader classes of compositions.
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A Supplementary Material
A.1 The Canonical Form for Two Binary Measurements
Theorem A.1. Let V be a finite dimensional C-vector space and let X0,X1 be Hermitian operators on V
satisfying ‖X0‖ , ‖X1‖ ≤ 1. Then, there exists a unitary embedding U : W → C2n, n ≥ 1, and operators
Y0,Y1 of the form
Y0 =


0 1
1 0
0 1
1 0
. . .
0 1
1 0


Y1 =


0 ζ1
ζ1 0
0 ζ2
ζ2 0
. . .
0 ζm j
ζm j 0


(A.1)
with ‖ζk‖ = 1, such that Xk = U∗YkU for k ∈ {0, 1}.
We prove this theorem by a series of lemmas. Consider the class of all triples (V,X0,X1) satis-
fying the condition from the first sentence of TheoremA.1. Consider the following two conditions
on such triples:
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(A) The operators Xk satisfy X
2
k = I.
(B) The vector space V is equal to Cm, and X0,X1 have a uniform diagonal block form:
Xk =


B1k
B2k
. . .
Brk
b1k
b2k
. . .
bsk


where 2r+ s = m, b
j
k ∈ {−1,+1} and each B
j
k is a 2× 2 Hermitian matrix with eigenvalues
+1 and −1.
Lemma A.2. Any triple (V,X0,X1) satisfying the conditions of Theorem A.1 has a unitary embedding
into a triple satisfying condition (A).
Proof. Let U : V → V ⊕ V be given by U(v) = v⊕ 0, and let {X′k | k = 0, 1} be the operators on
V ⊕V defined by
X′k =

 Xk
√
I− X2k√
I− X2k −Xk

 . (A.2)
It is easily checked that (X′k)
2 = I.
Lemma A.3. Any triple (V,X0,X1) satisfying condition (A) has a unitary embedding into a triple satis-
fying condition (B).
Proof. We can choose an orthonormal basis {v1, . . . , vdimV} for V such that X0 has the form
X0 =
[
In 0
0 −Im
]
. (A.3)
where Ir denotes the r × r identity matrix. By an appropriate unitary transformation of V that
respects this block structure, we obtain another orthonormal basis {v′1, . . . , v′dim v} such that X0
and X1 have the form
X0 =
[
In 0
0 −Im
]
and X1 =
[
A D
D∗ C
]
, (A.4)
where A and C are diagonal matrices. The condition X21 = I implies that A
2 + DD∗ = I and
D∗D+ C2 = I. Since both DD∗ and D∗D are diagonal, D is diagonal. Reordering the bases yields
the desired form.
Lemma A.4. Any triple (V,X0,X1) satisfying condition (B) has a unitary embedding into a triple of the
form (A.1).
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Proof. It suffices to prove the lemma for the case where X0,X1 are both scalars, and the case where
X0,X1 are each 2 × 2 Hermitian matrices with eigenvalues +1 and −1. The first case is easy
and is left to the reader. For the second case, we can find an orthonormal basis {v1, v2} for C2
under which X0 =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, and then find a basis of the form {(cos θ)v1 + i(sin θ)v2, (cos θ)v2 +
i(sin θ)v1} with z ∈ C, |z| = 1 under which X1 is an antidiagonal matrix.
This completes the proof of Theorem A.1.
A.2 Smooth Min-entropy and Renyi Divergence
This subsection provides supporting proofs for section 3.2.
Proposition A.5. Let α ∈ (1, 2]. Let ρ be a density operator on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space V, and
let σ be a positive semidefinite operator on V such that Supp σ ⊇ Supp ρ. Then, there exists a positive
semidefinite operator ρ′ such that ρ′ ≤ σ and
log
∥∥ρ− ρ′∥∥
1
≤ α− 1
2
· Dα(ρ‖σ) + 1
2
(A.5)
Proof. Our proof is based on the proof of Lemma 19 in [Dupuis et al., 2015] (which, in turn, is
based on [Tomamichel et al., 2009]). For any Hermitian operator H, let P+H denote projection on
the subspace spanned by the positive eigenvectors of H, and let Tr+(H) = Tr(P+HHP
+
H ). Let
δ = Tr+(ρ− σ). (A.6)
Note that, by the construction from the proof of Lemma 15 in [Tomamichel et al., 2009], there must
exist a subnormalized operator ρ′ such that ρ′ ≤ σ and ‖ρ′ − ρ‖1 ≤
√
2δ.
Let P = P+ρ−σ, and let P⊥ denote the complement of P. Note that by applying the data process-
ing inequality for Dα (see Theorem 5 in [Müller-Lennert et al., 2013]) to the quantum operation
X 7→ |0〉 〈0| ⊗ PXP+ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ P⊥XP⊥, we have
Dα(ρ‖σ) ≥ 1
α− 1 log
(
Tr
[(
(PσP)
1−α
2α (PρP)(PσP)
1−α
2α
)α
(A.7)
+
(
(P⊥(σ)P⊥)
1−α
2α (P⊥ρP⊥)(P⊥σP⊥)
1−α
2α
)α])
(A.8)
≥ 1
α− 1 log
(
Tr
[(
(PσP)
1−α
2α (PρP)(PσP)
1−α
2α
)α])
(A.9)
Let σ = PσP and ρ = PρP. We have the following.
Dα(ρ‖σ) ≥ 1
α− 1 log
(
Tr
[(
σ
1−α
2α ρσ
1−α
2α
) (
σ
1−α
2α ρσ
1−α
2α
)α−1])
(A.10)
Note that ρ ≥ σ by construction, and Z 7→ Zα−1 is a monotone function (see part (a) of Proposi-
tion 3.1). Therefore we have the following.
Dα(ρ‖σ) ≥ 1
α− 1 log
(
Tr
[(
σ
1−α
2α ρσ
1−α
2α
) (
σ
1−α
2α σσ
1−α
2α
)α−1])
(A.11)
≥ 1
α− 1 log
(
Tr
[(
σ
1−α
2α ρσ
1−α
2α
)
σ
α−1
α
])
(A.12)
≥ 1
α− 1 log (Tr [ρ]) (A.13)
≥ 1
α− 1 log δ (A.14)
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where in the last line we used the fact that Tr(ρ) ≥ Tr(ρ− σ) = δ. Let ρ′ be a positive semidefinite
operator satisfying ρ′ ≤ σ and ‖ρ′ − ρ‖1 ≤
√
2δ. Then we have
Dα(ρ‖σ) ≥ 1
α− 1 log
(∥∥ρ′ − ρ∥∥2
1
/2
)
, (A.15)
which implies the desired result.
Proposition A.6. Suppose that in Proposition A.5, V is the state space of a bipartite quantum system AB,
and ρ, σ are classical-quantum operators.7 Then, there exists an operator ρ′ satisfying the conditions of
Proposition A.5 such that ρ′ itself is a classical-quantum operator.
Proof. This is an easy consequence of the construction for ρ′ (from the proof of Lemma 15 in
[Tomamichel et al., 2009]) which was used in the proof of Proposition A.5.
of Proposition 3.5. Let λ be the quantity on the right side of inequality (3.22). We have
Dα(ρ‖2−λσ) = 2 log ǫ− 1
α− 1 . (A.16)
By Proposition A.5, we can find a positive semidefinite operator ρ′ ≤ 2−λσ such that∥∥ρ′ − ρ∥∥
1
≤ ǫ. (A.17)
The result follows from the definition of Dǫmax.
A.3 Variables and Functions Used in Section 7
In this subsection we collect together the variables in functions that are used in the proof of se-
curity for Protocol A′. We include also the assertions about the limits of the functions. (This is
intended just for the reader’s convenience — all these statements are included in the body of the
paper.)
Variables:
N ∈ N number of rounds
q ∈ (0, 1) test probability
t ∈ [0, 1] failure parameter
v ∈ (0, 1] trust coefficient
h ∈ [0, 1− v] coin flip coefficient
η ∈ (0, v/2) error tolerance
κ ∈ (0,∞) failure penalty
r ∈ (0, 1/(qκ)] multiplier for Rényi coefficient
ǫ ∈ (0,√2] error parameter for smooth min-entropy
Functions:
Note that the functions γ(q, κ, r) and r(v, η, q, κ) defined below are written simply as γ and r.
7That is, A is a classical register and ρ, σ have the form ρ = ∑i |ai〉 〈ai| ⊗ ρi and σ = ∑i |ai〉 〈ai| ⊗ σi where {a1, . . . , an}
is a standard basis for A.
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γ(q, κ, r) := qκr
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
γ(q, κ, r) = 0
Π(γ, t) := − 1
γ
log
{
2−γ
[
(1− t) 11+2γ + t 11+2γ
]1+2γ}
π(t) := 1− 2t log ( 1t )− 2(1− t) log ( 11−t)
lim
(q,κ,t)→(0,0,t0)
Π(γ, t) = π(t0)
λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t) :=
(
(1− q)2−γΠ(γ,t) + q
{
1− (1− 2−κ)[(h/2)1+γ + v1+γt]
})1/γ
Λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t) := − log(λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t))
lim
(q,κ,t)→(0,0,t0)
Λ(v, h, q, κ, r, t) = π(t0) +
h/2+ vt0
r
∆(v, h, q, κ, r) := min
s∈[0,1]
Λ(v, h, q, κ, r, s)
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
∆(v, h, q, κ, r) = min
s∈[0,1]
(
π(s) +
h/2+ vs
r
)
64
R(v, h, η, q, κ, r) := −h/2+ η
r
+ ∆(v, h, q, κ, r)
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
R(v, h, η, q, κ, r) = min
s∈[0,1]
[
π(s) +
vs− η
r
]
r(v, η, q, κ) := min
{
v
−π′(η/v) ,
1
qκ
}
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
r(v, η, q, κ) =
v
−π′(η/v)
T(v, h, η, q, κ) := R(v, h, η, q, κ, r)
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
T(v, h, η, q, κ) = π(η/v)
F(v, h, η, q, κ) :=
2
r
lim
(q,κ)→(0,0)
F(v, h, η, q, κ) =
−2π′(η/v)
v
A.4 Mathematical Results
Proposition A.7. Let U ⊆ Rn, let z ∈ Rn be an element in the closure of U, and let f , g be continuous
functions from U to R. Suppose that
lim
x→z f (x) = 0 (A.18)
and
lim
x→z
f (x)
g(x)
= c. (A.19)
Then,
lim
x→z(1+ f (x))
1/g(x) = ec. (A.20)
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Proof. This can be proved easily by taking the natural logarithm of both sides of (A.20).
Proposition A.8. Let U ⊆ Rn and V ⊆ Rm, and assume that V is compact. Let f : U × V → R be a
continuous function. Let z ∈ Rn be an element in the closure of U, and assume that lim(x,y)→(z,y0) f (x, y)
exists for every y0 ∈ V. Then,
lim
x→zminy∈V
f (x, y) = min
y∈V
lim
x→z f (x, y). (A.21)
Proof. By assumption, there exists a continuous extension of f to (U ∪ {z}) × V. Denote this
extension by f . Let h(x, y) = f (x, y)− f (z, y).
Let δ > 0. For any y ∈ V, since h(z, y) = 0 and h is continuous at (z, y), we can find an ǫy > 0
such that the values of h on the cylinder{
(x, y′) | |x− z| < ǫy, |y′ − y| < ǫy
}
(A.22)
are confined to [−δ, δ]. Since V is compact, we can choose a finite set S ⊆ V such that the
the ǫy-cylinders for y ∈ S cover V. Letting ǫ = miny∈S ǫy, we find that the values of h on
the ǫ-neighborhood of V are confined to [−δ, δ]. Therefore, the minimum of f (x, y) on the ǫ-
neighborhood of V is within δ of miny∈V f (z, y). The desired equality (A.21) follows.
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